Topic: Mind and Consciousness

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational and Real / Mind-Brain Identity / Phenomenal Properties

Camp Statement
Go live Time :

Property Dualism

We believe there are simply two types of properties of nature.
  1. Cause and effect behavioral properties
  2. Phenomenal properties
Things that have phenomenal properties also have behavioral properties. As such they are susceptible to traditional observation via our senses or scientific instruments according to their causal behavior.
When A 'red' strawberry reflects 700 nm light the resulting pattern of 700 nm light abstractly represents 'red', but fundamentally is not anything like 'red'. This abstracted 'red' information transitions through many more physical representations as it travels into our eyes and on to our consciousness. Similarly, none of these intermediate representations are neither fundamentally or phenomenally like 'red'. They are just behaving in a way that can abstractly represent or be mapped to 'red'.
The final result of the perception process is some phenomenal information in our visual field. This final phenomenal representation is what true 'red' fundamentally is. We believe this red to be a fundamental property of something in our brain. The fact that the strawberry reflects 700 nm light has nothing to do with 'red' other than it is what our brain happens to represent it with. Phenomenally, we have no idea what the strawberry is really like. We only know what it behaves like, and our brain represent this behavior with phenomenal 'red'.
If we shined some light on whatever it is in our brain that has this phenomenal property, it surely would not reflect the same 700 nm light. It would much more likely reflect some 'grey' or some other brain color. But, again, such reflected light would not be fundamentally or phenomenally anything like 'red'. The grey light would simply represent what our brain uses to represent whatever it is in our brain that has these 'red' phenomenal properties.
For a description of how we believe these phenomenal properties can be 'effed', as in 'effing' the ineffable, see the parent Representational Qualia Theory camp.
This theory is a competitor to David Chalmers 'arises from any equivalent functional organization' theory. For more detail about this, and how this competes with that and other theories regarding the 'Hard Problem' see this parallel camp we are also in here.

Support Tree for "Phenomenal Properties" Camp

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Current Topic Record

Topic Name : Mind and Consciousness
Namespace : /General/

Current Camp Record

Camp Name : Phenomenal Properties
Keywords : nature, phenomenal
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