Topic: Theories of Consciousness

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational Qualia / Mind-Brain Identity / Property Dualism / Panexperientialism / Multisense Realism

Camp Statement
Go live Time :

Multisense Realism is a conjecture on the nature of consciousness based on the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to an experiential primitive, then nature of which is aesthetic (sensory-motive) rather than anesthetic (physical-informative). The justification for this is parsimony: There is no plausible explanation for phenomena that are defined as physical or computational to generate anything that 'seems' like anything other than it is. The capacity for 'seeming' is, by definition both redundant and impossible in physical or logical terms.

To solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness via physical or information theory would require defining those anesthetic phenomena in such a nebulous way that anything, including aesthetic properties, can be made to seem plausible as 'emergent properties' or 'illusion'. This solution fails on the grounds of being both anti-parsimonious and fallacious, as it seeks to explain the physicality of a phenomenon experienced as non-physical purely by presuming in advance that it is physical.

Multisense Realism (MSR) integrates concrete physics and abstract logic into a larger continuum of experienced properties which transcend subjective and objective distinctions. Concrete objects for example, are proposed to be artifacts of a particular band of the universal aesthetic spectrum. We would call that band 'tangibility'.

In Kantian terms, MSR suggests that there may be no noumenal reality, and that the foundation of nature and supernatural-seeming experiences alike are phenomenological. This is not a Simulation hypothesis since the dream of nature is a single, eternal dream from which nothing can awaken except into another, more inclusive dream. Dreams are relatively unreal, but only because the experience of finally awakening completely is one that belongs to the most inclusive and tangible dream.

MSR proposes a general schema of how the sense of subjectivity and objectivity arise from a partial splitting or diffraction of the all-inclusive history of experience. While similar to nondualism of Advaita Vedanta and the Kabbalistic concept of Tzimtzum, which also posit a fundamental 'everythingness' being divided or alienated into the natural world, MSR seeks to provide clarity on the nature of that seeming fragmentation.

I include some diagrams here to convey a sense of that:








In broad terms, MSR conceives of existence itself as an irreducibly aesthetic-participatory, creative phenomenon (Holos) which is spatiotemporally 'graphed' (diffracted) through manipulation of nested scales of perceptual rates and types. Physical phenomena arise from interference patterns of the sense of tangibility, which is itself an interruption of the unity with Holos. Subjectivity is the temporal division of the aesthetic Holos, and Objectivity is the intersubjective rendering of that division.

MSR questions deep assumptions about the nature of 'fields', 'forces', 'light', and 'information' and arrives at an outline of a new metaphysics based on sensory-motive aesthetics rather than anesthetic laws of information processing or mass-energetic geometry. It is math and physics which are emergent, incomplete, and holographic. Subjective consciousness, while incomplete in a different sense, is a much richer and complete model of the Holos of nature. The incompleteness of subjectivity is only one of degree, whereas the incompleteness of math and physics is one of kind.

More on Multisense Realism at http://multisenserealism.com

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Current Topic Record

Topic Name : Theories of Consciousness
Namespace : /General/

Current Camp Record

Camp Name : Multisense Realism
Keywords : Involuted monism, sense, symmetry, significance, cosmos
Camp About URL : http://multisenserealism.com/about/
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