This is a functionalist camp like Functional Property Dualism. In contrast, we deny the existence of any ‘phenomenal’ properties such as are claimed in property dualism.
We use the term 'qualia' to refer to our subjective experiences. These subjective experiences are emergent phenomena that begin and end within our brains (a form of Mind Brain Identity Theory)
We reject theories that suggest 'qualia' possess or depend upon any magical or supernatural concepts.
We affirm that a simulated human brain would experience 'qualia' to the same extent as the natural human brain does.
The main support for mind-brain identity theory is the phenomenon of localization. We believe mental events are associated with specific parts of the brain. Mental activity is localized in identifiable areas of the brain. This is shown by the fact that inhibiting brain activity inhibits mental activity. Those who suffer localized brain damage also suffer localized damage to the mind.