Topic: Theories of Consciousness

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational Qualia / Dualism / Property Dualism / Mind-Brain Identity / Rep. Functionctionalism

Camp Statement
Go live Time :

We use the term 'qualia' to refer to our subjective experiences. These subjective experiences are emergent phenomena that begin and end within our brains (a form of Mind Brain Identity Theory). We reject the notion of the existence of epiphenomenal qualia, and we deny the existence of any 'phenomenal' properties such as are claimed by the property dualists ( . We reject theories that suggest 'qualia' possess or depend upon any magical or supernatural concepts. We affirm that a simulated human brain would experience 'qualia' to the same extent as the natural human brain does.
Thus, this camp involves a strict type of mind brain identity theory, but one that denies dual properties unlike this related PD-MBI camp
We believe that the mind or consciousness is identical with brain states. As it states at "for every mental state there is a brain-state with which it is identical."
The main support for mind-brain identity theory is the phenomenon of localization. We believe mental events are associated with specific parts of the brain. Mental activity is localized in identifiable areas of the brain. This is shown by the fact that inhibiting brain activity inhibits mental activity. Those who suffer localized brain damage also suffer localized damage to the mind.

Support Tree for "Rep. Functionctionalism" Camp

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Current Topic Record

Topic Name : Theories of Consciousness
Namespace : /General/

Current Camp Record

Camp Name : Rep. Functionctionalism
Parent Camp : Mind-Brain Identity
Keywords :
Camp About URL :
Camp About Nick Name : No nickname associated
Disable additional sub camps : No
Single level camps only : No