Contemporary philosophy of mind unfortunately has been burdened for decades with a residual philosophical behaviorism and intellectualized naive realism. Unpacking these terms, the fashionable behaviorism devolved from such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle and later elaborated by such academics as Paul and Patricia Churchland, and Daniel Dennett makes of mind (cognition, perception, emotions) an ontological nonentity. This program is ostensibly directed against 'dualist ghost stuff' whose existence conflicts with a sanitized materialist worldview (called 'physicalism' respecting the contents of mind). 'Naive realism' is shorthand for a number of conceptual errors respecting the nature and locale of sensory phenomenology ('qualia') as tastes, sounds, visual percepts.
What is called 'reductionism' in extant philosophy of mind is often no other than an amalgam of this behaviorism with naive realism. Philosophical behaviorism is an ideology that was ejected from psychology in the 1960s at the latest, while naive realistic philosophy ('direct realism') is incoherent with the known physics, physiology, and phenomenology of perception. Until these two fundamental oversights are rectified through collective insight, fundamental progress in the questions of mind and brain is scarcely possible insofar as a proper inventory and discrimination of phenomenal and physical contents is precluded.
The purpose of this topic is to be a ranked list of good publications on representationalism and the relationship between the objective and subjective in the study of the mind.