Although there is no question that neural circuits in the brain achieve some sort of representation of the world, there is some discussion about the nature of the difference between Functional aspects of Consciousness and Phenomenal aspects of consciousness. A strict 1:1 ratio between function and phenomena is not possible. Some think that this is because there is an explanatory gap. But discussion on the gap seems to point out that the main problems lie in understanding why we feel, not in understanding the functional aspect of feelings. Each feeling, in some way constrains the processing of the brain so that it falls within a range of operation, that maximizes performance. As such the Function of feelings is parameterization of the control/executive function of the brain. It is the contention of the Representational Illusory camp, that the "Phenomenal" experience of feeling, is a simplification of the control system, that gives us an illusion of representation of constraints against the backdrop of the Representational image of the world and our place within it. In essence the control mechanism projects the feelings onto the image of the world, thus constraining the interpretation of the world, to fit within operational parameters. One aspect of this, is the "Causal" factor which is also well discussed by philosophers working in the explanatory gap. In the model suggested here, the feelings are actually feedback projected onto the experience of the world, by the control/executive systems of the brain. The confusion over Causality, comes about because of the Illusion of Will, that somehow Consciousness makes decisions, that "Cause" action. Will is seen as a phenomenal aspect of consciousness. However recent research calls into question the nature of the Causality of the Illusion of Will, in that Consciousness has been shown to be a late-comer to the executive process, and that therefore many of the decisions are already made before consciousness "Will" could possibly apply. One way of looking at this, is that the illusion of Will is created as a feedback needed for attribution, and because the attribution is connected to the feedback, the illusion is that the feedback in some manner "Caused" the action.