According to Lycan's sense, Qualia are the ï¬rst-order phenomenal properties of (some) mental states (Brie Gertler). But this phenomenal character which define the qualitative features of the objective reality of what it is really like constitutes Chalmer's "the hard problem of consciousness."
The foundations of human consciousness lie at the very core of the subjective states of feeling-Qualia. From the point of ontological perspective in order to understand the true essence of conscious awareness and human conscious theoretic thought processes, the basic assumption of qualia cannot be repudiated. This would entail to further augment the pure comprehension of the matters of the mind, of mind itself which is a causal phenomenon of the neurocentric brain processes. To override the states of subjective feeling is to renounce and reject the very essence of the human existential nature to those related to the nature of human emotion, sentiment and sensation. The latter one, sensation is the implicit or tacit reaction on account of the processes of perception. To sense something is to perceive it first, to feel something is to recognize the objective reality of the perceived entity. The process of perception is external to the central components of the brain organized into organs of perception by means of which we sense rather comprehend the reality. To distinguish between objects of whether an apple is red or a mango is green, our sense organs assembles the perceived information from the entities directly and based on the information which is received, our brain integrates such, processes those and constructs the real reflection of the representation. That representation we call reality. So, qualia can be said of about the quality of representation of the objective reality into its subjective states of impression from which, we derive ideas and based on such ideas, we reason, intent and even question the validity of such ideas generated in our brain. Our neural processes transforms these perceived sensation into thoughtful meanings to represent what that is required to know whether it is an apple which is red or otherwise.
The question is, whether the brain states and the sensory processes are identical to those process and products of perceived sensation-the states of feeling-qualia. The causal phenomenon which gives rise to the processes of perception and integration of the perceived information is purely physical, but the nature of the "notionally" felt qualities is however contentious in the light of physicalism. The feeling of what is being felt is ineffable, though it is which that determines the way things look to us. Of contentious debate related to whether consciousness and qualia can or cannot be reduced, one argument has recently taken shape as of whether consciousness and qualia are same or non-identical process or otherwise (Robert Ettinger). Is quale possible without consciousness but when in it is the phenomenon of qualia which is often disclaimed by physicalists and neuroscientists? That there is no physical explanation of the qualia process which only exists in subjective states not reducible by physicalism is still a greater challenge to the philosophers of mind (or non-reductionist theory predominates the former reductionist).
Now when considered from the AI perspective of artificial minds having some kind of synthetic embodied awareness, the representational attributes of conscious qualia at the functional level posit as difficult problem since the tools of thought processes of the human brain along with their biological correlates are entirely different from that of artificial cognitive systems(ACS). Since, the science of the mind states that conscious awareness originates from the neural complexity of the brain. By assuming such a statement to be some sort of a benchmark for consciousness to originate, why wouldn't it be possible for a complex neural network as composite as our own brain (consisting of a different kinds of correlates from that of a machine brain) to generate phenomenal consciousness and then again, qualia? That said again, why cannot a machine (cognitive)network think like a human do?