- Lean Toward: Disjunctivism: 259 / 3226 (8%)
- Accept: Disjunctivism: 99 / 3226 (3%)
- Total: 358 / 3226 (11%)
Denies the 'common kind assumption' - that the perception is the same as the hallucination.
A subset of, or at least related to 'naive realism'
In Chalmers' 2004 paper "Perception and the Fall from Eden"
(In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press, 2006.) he has a note on page 6 that describes his ideas about various kinds of disjunctivism most of which he is "inclined to reject":
- Disjunctivism About Phenomenology: "Denies that experiences directed at different objects could have the same phenomenology, and denies that a hallucinatory experience could have the same phenomenology as an experience of an external object."
- Disjunctivism About Metaphysics: "A hallucinatory experience and an ordinary perceptual experience may share phenomenal character, but holds that they have a fundamentally distinct underlying metaphysical nature: one experience involves an object and one does not."
- Disjunctivism About Content: "These experiences have the same phenomenology, but holds that they have different representational contents: for example, experiences of different objects will have different object-involving contents." There are two sub types:
- Denies that there is any phenomenal content, holding that the relevant experiences share no content
- May accept that there is phenomenal content while holding that it is less fundamental than object-involving content