Disjunctivism

Lean Toward: Disjunctivism: 259 / 3226 (8%)
Accept: Disjunctivism: 99 / 3226 (3%)
Total: 358 / 3226 (11%)

Denies the 'common kind assumption' - that the perception is the same as the hallucination.

A subset of, or at least related to 'naive realism'

In Chalmers' 2004 paper "Perception and the Fall from Eden" (In (T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds) Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press, 2006.) he has a note on page 6 that describes his ideas about various kinds of disjunctivism most of which he is "inclined to reject":

Disjunctivism About Phenomenology: "Denies that experiences directed at different objects could have the same phenomenology, and denies that a hallucinatory experience could have the same phenomenology as an experience of an external object."
Disjunctivism About Metaphysics: "A hallucinatory experience and an ordinary perceptual experience may share phenomenal character, but holds that they have a fundamentally distinct underlying metaphysical nature: one experience involves an object and one does not."
Disjunctivism About Content: "These experiences have the same phenomenology, but holds that they have different representational contents: for example, experiences of different objects will have different object-involving contents." There are two sub types:

Denies that there is any phenomenal content, holding that the relevant experiences share no content
May accept that there is phenomenal content while holding that it is less fundamental than object-involving content