Topic: Theories of Consciousness

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational Qualia / Mind-Brain Identity / Monism / Qualia are Material Qualities

Camp Statement History

Objected
Live
Not Live
Old
Statement :

Qualia are Material Qualities


Representational Materialism predicts qualia are physical things. For example, without the right physics or energy (the exact thing that is a redness quale), there is no redness experience. In other words, a computer using abstractions to represent redness with 1s and 0s could never experience redness as it exists in the brain. Representational materialism is in contrast to functionalist theories that predict redness is a function (for example, the computer abstraction mentioned above).

Edit summary : Make the header name consistent with the new camp name: "Qualia are Material qualities."
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Representational Materialism


Representational Materialism predicts qualia are physical things. For example, without the right physics or energy (the exact thing that is a redness quale), there is no redness experience. In other words, a computer using abstractions to represent redness with 1s and 0s could never experience redness as it exists in the brain. Representational materialism is in contrast to functionalist theories that predict redness is a function (for example, the computer abstraction mentioned above).

Edit summary :
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Karl_Kjer
Go live Time :
Statement :

Material Property Dualism


Material Property Dualism (MPD) predicts there is something material in our brain which has the subjective qualities, such as redness, we experience. While Functional Property Dualism predicts the same experience will "arize" from "anything functionally equivalent" from neurons to silicone this theory predicts that without the right stuff, in the right state, a redness experience will not be possible. A quality like redness could be a quality of anything from quantum effects to some form of electromagnetic phenomenon, as being predicted by various sub camps theories.
David Chalmers authored the paper "Consciousness and its Place in Nature" where he nicely classifies various camps about consciousness. This Material Property Dualism camp is similar to the theories he classified as "Type F Monist".
MPD predicts qualities like a redness quale are the most absolutely fundamental properties in existence. Most people accept that the causal physical properties we can detect with our senses and scientific instruments are a fundamental part of nature. MPD predicts this is correct, but it also predicts that we must additionally realize that all we know of these causal physical properties, is abstracted information about their behavior we interpret from our senses. Because of the quale interpretation problem we are blind to anything other than this abstracted information about these behaviors. Our senses can't know any qualitative (in the quale sense) information of any natural stuff they are detecting. The world in our head image by Steven Lehar is meant to portray this in a vivid schematic way.


What is redness a quality of?

The Idealized Effing Theory World predicts it is something like glutamate that has a redness property, which our brain uses to 'paint' our phenomenal knowledge of a strawberry with. When we think of a strawberry out there we are perceiving, we imagine it as having a redness property. We tend to think of this redness quality as causing the surface of the strawberry to reflect 650 NM light. But of course, this would be a mistaken way to think about it, since if we add a red vs green inverter anywhere in the perception process, we will then represent the strawberry with knowledge that is made of greenness. Obviously, the greenness has nothing to do with the surface of the strawberry, and is only a concept in our mind we are using to think about the strawberry with.
But what, then is redness a quality of, and how is the best way to think about it? Material Property Dualism predicts the best way to think about a redness quality, is just the way we intuitively think of it as a property of the strawberry, causing 650 NM light to be reflected. It's just that redness is not a quality of the strawberry, it is a quality of something our brain is using as our knowledge of such. The causal properties of the neural correlates we already know about are what the qualities are causing, instead of the light being reflected off of the surface of the strawberry, because of its redness quality.
Obviously, 650 NM light doesn't reflect off of the strawberry, because we think of it as having a redness quality. But something, casual, is going on in our mind, because it does have a redness quality we can experience. We only say, yes, that is our redness, precisely because of its fundamental phenomenal quality. But, obviously, if we look at such brain stuff with abstracted observation systems that suffer from the quale interpretation problem, we will be completely missing a large part of why the particular behaviors we are observing, are behaving the way they are.
In the Idealized Effing Theory World, imagine if we set up an experiment where we repeatedly replaced different neurotransmitters representing someone's knowledge of a red point on the surface of a strawberry. The person would repeatedly say that is not my redness, until you used what really did have the redness property - glutamate. Of course, that is how it would be experienced. If you looked at this same system with an observation method that sufferers from the quale interpretation problem, since you would be completely blind to any of the fundamental phenomenal properties, the system would just look like a very good detector of glutamate. And you'd be able to simulate such abstracted knowledge in any old abstract computer system. But, you'd be missing quite a bit about why it was working the way it was working, and why it was capable of only saying "yes, that is my redness" with nothing but glutamate.

Abstracted Information

We think of bits, in a computer, the same way we think of redness on the surface of a strawberry. We imagine little ones and zeros laid out on a spinning disk the head is reading. But, just like the the fact that there is no redness on the surface of the strawberry, there are no ones or zeros on a spinning disk. The "bits" or abstracted information are all in our head. Just like you can invert the red/green signal in our perception process, you could add a bit inverter on the USB output of a hard disk. Even though the hard disk hasn't changed at all, other than this inverter on the output, suddenly all the ones are now zeros and visa versa.
In our brain, these ones and zeros can be strung together to make something like 0xFF0000, and we can think of this as 'red', 'stop' or even as representation of reality on which a higher level simulated computer is built and operating. But, again, none of these higher levels exist in the computer, they only exist in our head, as different ways to think about the fundamental natures of the stuff we've organized independent of whatever might be interpreted as representing such. No matter what level you think about it in any such abstracted way, it has no effect on the fundamental causal properties which we are interpreting at the fundamental basement, or any other, level. Other than our abstracted interpretations about any of the representations, it's all just the physical stuff, at the basement level, being interpreted at whatever level we decide in our heads.
Possibly starting with Alan Turing, and as our digital computers become ever more capable, there has been a growing in popularity idea that 'information' is more fundamental than any of these fundamental natures. One version of this kind of thinking is captured in the idea of "digital physics" which is making predictions like you can "get it from bit". But, again, the 'it' you get from any higher level simulated 'bit', doesn't really exist. 'bits' are just an abstracted way to think of the fundamental natures we've organized to behave the way we want them to, so we can think of them or interpret them as this 'it' we got from the 'bit'.
It seems to us to be sloppy thinking when people like Daniel Dennett make a claim like we don't have qualia 'it just seems like we do'. This is because we rigorously define 'seem' to be having knowledge that doesn't accurately represent its referent'. Given that definition the mistake becomes clear. Perhaps people that think this way are thinking of some other definition of what it means "to seem"?
Similarly, when intelligent people make a claim like we can get "it from bit" they are making yet another sloppy thinking mistake. Perhaps you can define 'information' and 'bits' in a different way, such that it is possible to base a theory of fundamental physics on such ideas - but you certainly can't use the common sense definition of an abstracted 'bit' as we've rigorously defined it here: "A 'bit' of information is only some way to interpret whatever is representing it, in a particular way, and has nothing to do with the representations fundamental natures which are being interpreted as such."

Edit summary : New Version after splits.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Material Property Dualism


David Chalmers authored the paper "Consciousness and its Place in Nature" where he nicely classifies various camps about consciousness. This Material Property Dualism camp is the same as the "Type F Monist" he describes in that paper. Though David's preferred theory is consistent with Functional Property Dualism, he also speaks highly of "Type F Monism" in that paper.
We predict that Functional Property Dualism and Chalmers' "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be a distracting waste of time. Trying to imagine how the same quale can arise from or in any way be tied to anything from water pipes, to silicon, to neurons is truly a 'hard' if not impossible problem. Instead, we think it is much more likely that there are simply some properties of particular matter in the right state, that have the subjective qualia we experience. Without the right stuff you cannot have the same quale or subjective experience.
Most theoreticians often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology confusing us and leading us away from reality. It is much better to simply say that something in nature has particular phenomenal properties, just as it also has particular causal properties.
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We have extensive reliable descriptions of the causal properties of this matter and how it behaves across space, time, temperature, and also at different levels such as sub atomic, molecular, chemical and biological. We don't ask why or how these elements behave as they do at these different levels, we just know that they reliably do behave that way. We make models or descriptions of such causal properties that can be reliably interpreted as behaving like them. In addition to these causal properties, this theory predicts that we will also find and map out ineffable phenomenal properties that subjects reliably experience when the matter is properly configured into the right neural correlate state. (see Note 1) We predict that in addition to the subject being able to reliably feel the same set of qualia of this matter, we will be able to causally observe the same stuff as the causes and effects of these neural correlates are unified into a physical awareness working space. Subjectively, we will be aware of the green leaves and the red strawberries that is our knowledge that allows us to choose to pick the strawberry. Causally, we will also be able to see the same neural correlate process as it unifies it all together as we watch the mechanics of how our knowledge of the stuff that has the red and green properties enables us to be subjectively aware of such, and how such allows us to choose to pick the strawberry from the leaves. We believe looking and testing for this in this way will be much more fruitful than thinking about or looking or testing for Functional Property Dualism or the idea that "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes. Asking an abstracted silicon machine that is functioning in a way that it is attempting to pass a Turing Test something like: 'what is red like for you' is just a bad idea.
Once we discover these neural correlate processes where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness, both subjectively and objectively, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains. V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein were the first to propose the idea of effing the ineffable (though they didn't call it such) by connecting brains with a 'cable of neurons' in their seminal Three Laws of Qualia paper in 1997.
The main reason people feel they are compelled to accept the very hard functional property dualism centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" thought experiment or Neuron Replacement Therapy. We believe this argument is a fallacy as described in this camp on that topic. Thinking that the discrete firing of the neurons, in a computer switching kind of way, does not resolve the 'binding problem'. There must be more to this phenomenal binding process than this simple discrete neural firing that causes the neural replacement thinking fallacy.
We believe "Material Property Dualism" to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can somehow arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We see no difference from this than thinking something can come from nothing. If you know something, whether phenomenally or otherwise, there must be something fundamental that is that knowledge. This is very true for today's (potentially multilevel) abstracted simulations. There is something fundamentally real at the basement level that is representing everything at all levels that is being interpreted in a proper way to be functioning like something non virtual.
We believe that to even think our phenomenal minds could be in a simulation is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, the way our brain uses such fundamental stuff to represent our knowledge, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an "arises from anything" idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from physical reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary. If science effingly proves material property dualism to be true, we will know what must be the basement level is fundamentally like, and it will not be possible that this is in a simulation.
At this camp level, although the Consciousness Arises From Anything is the more popular camp, this camp currently has more expert scientific consensus as is shown when you use the 'mind expert' canonization algorithm on the side bar.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements as some kind of standing wave as is argued for by Steven Lehar here. It could also be involved at the quantum level.



Edit summary : Point out MPD is same as Chalmers "Type F Monism"
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Material Property Dualism



We predict David Chalmers is pushing in a mistaken direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be a distracting waste of time. Trying to imagine how the same quale can arise from or in any way be tied to anything from water pipes, to silicon, to neurons is truly a 'hard' if not impossible problem. Instead, we think it is much more likely that there are simply some properties of particular matter in the right state, that have the subjective qualia we experience. Without the right stuff you cannot have the same quale or subjective experience.
Most theoreticians often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology confusing us and leading us away from reality. It is much better to simply say that something in nature has particular phenomenal properties, just as it also has particular causal properties.
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We have extensive reliable descriptions of the causal properties of this matter and how it behaves across space, time, temperature, and also at different levels such as sub atomic, molecular, chemical and biological. We don't ask why or how these elements behave as they do at these different levels, we just know that they reliably do behave that way. We make models or descriptions of such causal properties that can be reliably interpreted as behaving like them. In addition to these causal properties, this theory predicts that we will also find and map out ineffable phenomenal properties that subjects reliably experience when the matter is properly configured into the right neural correlate state. (see Note 1) We predict that in addition to the subject being able to reliably feel the same set of qualia of this matter, we will be able to causally observe the same stuff as the causes and effects of these neural correlates are unified into a physical awareness working space. Subjectively, we will be aware of the green leaves and the red strawberries that is our knowledge that allows us to choose to pick the strawberry. Causally, we will also be able to see the same neural correlate process as it unifies it all together as we watch the mechanics of how our knowledge of the stuff that has the red and green properties enables us to be subjectively aware of such, and how such allows us to choose to pick the strawberry from the leaves. We believe looking and testing for this in this way will be much more fruitful than thinking about or looking or testing for Functional Property Dualism or the idea that "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes. Asking an abstracted silicon machine that is functioning in a way that it is attempting to pass a Turing Test something like: 'what is red like for you' is just a bad idea.
Once we discover these neural correlate processes where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness, both subjectively and objectively, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains. V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein were the first to propose the idea of effing the ineffable (though they didn't call it such) by connecting brains with a 'cable of neurons' in their seminal Three Laws of Qualia paper in 1997.
The main reason people feel they are compelled to accept the very hard functional property dualism centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" thought experiment or Neuron Replacement Therapy. We believe this argument is a fallacy as described in this camp on that topic. Thinking that the discrete firing of the neurons, in a computer switching kind of way, does not resolve the 'binding problem'. There must be more to this phenomenal binding process than this simple discrete neural firing that causes the neural replacement thinking fallacy.
We believe "Material Property Dualism" to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can somehow arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We see no difference from this than thinking something can come from nothing. If you know something, whether phenomenally or otherwise, there must be something fundamental that is that knowledge. This is very true for today's (potentially multilevel) abstracted simulations. There is something fundamentally real at the basement level that is representing everything at all levels that is being interpreted in a proper way to be functioning like something non virtual.
We believe that to even think our phenomenal minds could be in a simulation is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, the way our brain uses such fundamental stuff to represent our knowledge, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an "arises from anything" idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from physical reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary. If science effingly proves material property dualism to be true, we will know what must be the basement level is fundamentally like, and it will not be possible that this is in a simulation.
At this camp level, although the Consciousness Arises From Anything is the more popular camp, this camp currently has more expert scientific consensus as is shown when you use the 'mind expert' canonization algorithm on the side bar.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements as some kind of standing wave as is argued for by Steven Lehar here. It could also be involved at the quantum level.



Edit summary : correction: it's "silicon" not "silicone"
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : richwil
Go live Time :
Statement :

Material Property Dualism



We predict David Chalmers is pushing in a mistaken direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be a distracting waste of time. Trying to imagine how the same quale can arise from or in any way be tied to anything from water pipes, to silicon, to neurons is truly a 'hard' if not impossible problem. Instead, we think it is much more likely that there are simply some properties of particular matter in the right state, that have the subjective qualia we experience. Without the right stuff you cannot have the same quale or subjective experience.
Most theoreticians often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology confusing us and leading us away from reality. It is much better to simply say that something in nature has particular phenomenal properties, just as it also has particular causal properties.
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We have extensive reliable descriptions of the causal properties of this matter and how it behaves across space, time, temperature, and also at different levels such as sub atomic, molecular, chemical and biological. We don't ask why or how these elements behave as they do at these different levels, we just know that they reliably do behave that way. We make models or descriptions of such causal properties that can be reliably interpreted as behaving like them. In addition to these causal properties, this theory predicts that we will also find and map out ineffable phenomenal properties that subjects reliably experience when the matter is properly configured into the right neural correlate state. (see Note 1) We predict that in addition to the subject being able to reliably feel the same set of qualia of this matter, we will be able to causally observe the same stuff as the causes and effects of these neural correlates are unified into a physical awareness working space. Subjectively, we will be aware of the green leaves and the red strawberries that is our knowledge that allows us to choose to pick the strawberry. Causally, we will also be able to see the same neural correlate process as it unifies it all together as we watch the mechanics of how our knowledge of the stuff that has the red and green properties enables us to be subjectively aware of such, and how such allows us to choose to pick the strawberry from the leaves. We believe looking and testing for this in this way will be much more fruitful than thinking about or looking or testing for Functional Property Dualism or the idea that "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes. Asking an abstracted silicone machine that is functioning in a way that it is attempting to pass a Turing Test something like: 'what is red like for you' is just a bad idea.
Once we discover these neural correlate processes where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness, both subjectively and objectively, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains. V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein were the first to propose the idea of effing the ineffable (though they didn't call it such) by connecting brains with a 'cable of neurons' in their seminal Three Laws of Qualia paper in 1997.
The main reason people feel they are compelled to accept the very hard functional property dualism centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" thought experiment or Neuron Replacement Therapy. We believe this argument is a fallacy as described in this camp on that topic. Thinking that the discrete firing of the neurons, in a computer switching kind of way, does not resolve the 'binding problem'. There must be more to this phenomenal binding process than this simple discrete neural firing that causes the neural replacement thinking fallacy.
We believe "Material Property Dualism" to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can somehow arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We see no difference from this than thinking something can come from nothing. If you know something, whether phenomenally or otherwise, there must be something fundamental that is that knowledge. This is very true for today's (potentially multilevel) abstracted simulations. There is something fundamentally real at the basement level that is representing everything at all levels that is being interpreted in a proper way to be functioning like something non virtual.
We believe that to even think our phenomenal minds could be in a simulation is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, the way our brain uses such fundamental stuff to represent our knowledge, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an "arises from anything" idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from physical reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary. If science effingly proves material property dualism to be true, we will know what must be the basement level is fundamentally like, and it will not be possible that this is in a simulation.
At this camp level, although the Consciousness Arises From Anything is the more popular camp, this camp currently has more expert scientific consensus as is shown when you use the 'mind expert' canonization algorithm on the side bar.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements as some kind of standing wave as is argued for by Steven Lehar here. It could also be involved at the quantum level.



Edit summary : Causal is better than Behavioral.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Material Property Dualism



We predict David Chalmers is pushing in a mistaken direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be a distracting waste of time. Trying to imagine how the same quale can arise from or in any way be tied to anything from water pipes, to silicon, to neurons is truly a 'hard' if not impossible problem. Instead, we think it is much more likely that there are simply some properties of particular matter in the right state, that have the subjective qualia we experience. Without the right stuff you cannot have the same quale or subjective experience.
Most theoreticians often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology confusing us and leading us away from reality. It is much better to simply say that something in nature has particular phenomenal properties, just as it also has particular behavioral properties.
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We have extensive reliable descriptions of the causal properties of this matter and how it behaves across space, time, temperature, and also at different levels such as sub atomic, molecular, chemical and biological. We don't ask why or how these elements behave as they do at these different levels, we just know that they reliably do behave that way. We make models or descriptions of such causal properties that can be reliably interpreted as behaving like them. In addition to these causal properties, this theory predicts that we will also find and map out ineffable phenomenal properties that subjects reliably experience when the matter is properly configured into the right neural correlate state. (see Note 1) We predict that in addition to the subject being able to reliably feel the same set of qualia of this matter, we will be able to causally observe the same stuff as the causes and effects of these neural correlates are unified into a physical awareness working space. Subjectively, we will be aware of the green leaves and the red strawberries that is our knowledge that allows us to choose to pick the strawberry. Causally, we will also be able to see the same neural correlate process as it unifies it all together as we watch the mechanics of how our knowledge of the stuff that has the red and green properties enables us to be subjectively aware of such, and how such allows us to choose to pick the strawberry from the leaves. We believe looking and testing for this in this way will be much more fruitful than thinking about or looking or testing for Functional Property Dualism or the idea that "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes. Asking an abstracted silicone machine that is functioning in a way that it is attempting to pass a Turing Test something like: 'what is red like for you' is just a bad idea.
Once we discover these neural correlate processes where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness, both subjectively and objectively, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains. V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein were the first to propose the idea of effing the ineffable (though they didn't call it such) by connecting brains with a 'cable of neurons' in their seminal Three Laws of Qualia paper in 1997.
The main reason people feel they are compelled to accept the very hard functional property dualism centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" thought experiment or Neuron Replacement Therapy. We believe this argument is a fallacy as described in this camp on that topic. Thinking that the discrete firing of the neurons, in a computer switching kind of way, does not resolve the 'binding problem'. There must be more to this phenomenal binding process than this simple discrete neural firing that causes the neural replacement thinking fallacy.
We believe "Material Property Dualism" to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can somehow arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We see no difference from this than thinking something can come from nothing. If you know something, whether phenomenally or otherwise, there must be something fundamental that is that knowledge. This is very true for today's (potentially multilevel) abstracted simulations. There is something fundamentally real at the basement level that is representing everything at all levels that is being interpreted in a proper way to be functioning like something non virtual.
We believe that to even think our phenomenal minds could be in a simulation is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, the way our brain uses such fundamental stuff to represent our knowledge, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an "arises from anything" idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from physical reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary. If science effingly proves material property dualism to be true, we will know what must be the basement level is fundamentally like, and it will not be possible that this is in a simulation.
At this camp level, although the Consciousness Arises From Anything is the more popular camp, this camp currently has more expert scientific consensus as is shown when you use the 'mind expert' canonization algorithm on the side bar.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements as some kind of standing wave as is argued for by Steven Lehar here. It could also be involved at the quantum level.



Edit summary : Simplify and rename to "Material Property Dualism"
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Property Dualism


We believe that matter has two very different classes of properties.
  1. Cause and effect behavioral properties
  2. Phenomenal properties

We know a lot about the causal or behavioral properties of matter. By definition, phenomenal properties of matter are ineffable - they are blind to abstracting cause and effect perception. If we shin some light on whatever it is in our brain that has this phenomenal property, it surely would not reflect the same 700 nm light. It would much more likely reflect some 'grey' or some other brain color. But, again, such reflected light would not be fundamentally or phenomenally anything like 'red'. The grey light would simply represent what our brain uses to represent whatever it is in our brain that has these 'red' phenomenal properties. For a description of how we believe these phenomenal properties can be 'effed', as in 'effing' the ineffable, see the parent Representational Qualia Theory camp.
At this level, although the Consciousness Arises From Anything is the more popular camp, this camp currently has more expert scientific consensus.
We believe David Chalmers is pushing in a mistaken direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, we will see the behavior of something science has already taught us about. It is just that such abstracted information about behavior will not contain any ineffable information about it, or what it is phenomenally like. And we certainly shouldn't expect it to reflect 700 nm light.
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties of particular neural correlates that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. Note 1 This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains. V.S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein were the first to propose the idea of effing the ineffable (though they didn't call it such) in their seminal Three Laws of Qualia paper in 1997.
Chalmers primary argument centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" thought experiment. We accept the Transmigration Fallacy camp that points out the mistakes being made with this argument.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can somehow arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says: "My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements. The idea is that consistently, something like a set of elements, in a specific active neuronal structure, will always have a particular phenomenal property, and that this will be consistently repeatable in other brains, enabling objective "effing" of what they are phenomenally like. And of course these structures will not reflect 700 nm (red) light when the brain surgeon looks at them


Edit summary : Merge and clean up this camp and the paralel hard problem camp.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Property Dualism


We believe there are simply two types of properties of nature.
  1. Cause and effect behavioral properties
  2. Phenomenal properties

Things that have phenomenal properties also have behavioral properties. As such they are susceptible to traditional observation via our senses or scientific instruments according to their causal behavior.
When A 'red' strawberry reflects 700 nm light the resulting pattern of 700 nm light abstractly represents 'red', but fundamentally is not anything like 'red'. This abstracted 'red' information transitions through many more physical representations as it travels into our eyes and on to our consciousness. Similarly, none of these intermediate representations are neither fundamentally or phenomenally like 'red'. They are just behaving in a way that can abstractly represent or be mapped to 'red'.
The final result of the perception process is some phenomenal information in our visual field. This final phenomenal representation is what true 'red' fundamentally is. We believe this red to be a fundamental property of something in our brain. The fact that the strawberry reflects 700 nm light has nothing to do with 'red' other than it is what our brain happens to represent it with. Phenomenally, we have no idea what the strawberry is really like. We only know what it behaves like, and our brain represent this behavior with phenomenal 'red'.
If we shined some light on whatever it is in our brain that has this phenomenal property, it surely would not reflect the same 700 nm light. It would much more likely reflect some 'grey' or some other brain color. But, again, such reflected light would not be fundamentally or phenomenally anything like 'red'. The grey light would simply represent what our brain uses to represent whatever it is in our brain that has these 'red' phenomenal properties.
For a description of how we believe these phenomenal properties can be 'effed', as in 'effing' the ineffable, see the parent Representational Qualia Theory camp.
This theory is a competitor to David Chalmers 'arises from any equivalent functional organization' theory. For more detail about this, and how this competes with that and other theories regarding the 'Hard Problem' see this parallel camp we are also in here.


Edit summary : New Name: Property Dualism.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
We believe there are simply two types of properties of nature.
  1. Cause and effect behavioral properties
  2. Phenomenal properties

Things that have phenomenal properties also have behavioral properties. As such they are susceptible to traditional observation via our senses or scientific instruments according to their causal behavior.
When A 'red' strawberry reflects 700 nm light the resulting pattern of 700 nm light abstractly represents 'red', but fundamentally is not anything like 'red'. This abstracted 'red' information transitions through many more physical representations as it travels into our eyes and on to our consciousness. Similarly, none of these intermediated representations are neither fundamentally or phenomenally like 'red'. They are just behaving in a way that can abstractly represent or be mapped to 'red'.
The final result of the perception process is some phenomenal information in our visual field. This final phenomenal representation is what true 'red' fundamentally is. We believe this red to be a fundamental property of something in our brain. The fact that the strawberry reflects 700 nm light has nothing to do with 'red' other than it is what our brain happens to represent it with. Phenomenally, we have no idea what the strawberry is really like. We only know what it behaves like, and our brain represent this behavior with phenomenal 'red'.
If we shined some light on whatever it is in our brain that has this phenomenal property, it surely would not reflect the same 700 nm light. It would much more likely reflect some 'grey' or some other brain color. But, again, such reflected light would not be fundamentally or phenomenally anything like 'red'. The grey light would simply represent what our brain uses to represent whatever it is in our brain that has these 'red' phenomenal properties.
For a description of how we believe these phenomenal properties can be 'effed', as in 'effing' the ineffable, see the parent Consciousness is Real camp.
This theory is a competitor to David Chalmers 'arises from any equivalent functional organization' theory. For more detail about this, and how this competes with that and other theories regarding the 'Hard Problem' see this parallel camp we are also in here.


Edit summary : First Version
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :