We believe the hard problem of consciousness has a molecular and neural basis. While it is possible that the phenomenal nature of qualia could involve such things as sub atomic or quantum phenomena, such is definitely not necessarily so. We believe that time spent theorizing about such, or experimentally looking for such, to be an unnecessary distraction that will not help us achieve an understanding of what is most important about consciousness.
See the Mind-Brain Identity camp in the theories of consciousness topic.
We believe that the mind or consciousness is identical with brain states. As it states at philosophyofmind.info: "for every mental state there is a brain-state with which it is identical."
The main support for mind-brain identity theory is the phenomenon of localization. We believe mental events are associated with specific parts of the brain. Mental activity is localized in identifiable areas of the brain. This is shown by the fact that inhibiting brain activity inhibits mental activity. Those who suffer localized brain damage also suffer localized damage to the mind.
We believe in the molecular and neural basis of thought and memory. While it is possible that such things as sub atomic or quantum phenomena might be an important part of consciousness, such is definitely not necessarily so. We believe that time spent theorizing about such, or experimentally looking for such, to be an unnecessary distraction that will not help us achieve an understanding of what is most important about consciousness.
Many Mind-Brain Identity supporters, may or may not be representationalists, and may or may not believe in the importance of qualia or phenomenal properties. As should be obvious by the supporting parent camps to this camp, we believe consciousness is representational and that phenomenal properties, or qualia, are a critical and fundamental part of consciousness. The various diverse theories of what and how qualia are held by members of this camp are contained in supporting sub camps.