Topic: Hard Problem

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational Qualia / Mind-Brain Identity / Functional Prprty Dualism

Camp Statement History

Objected
Live
In Review
Old
Statement : We are in the Functional Property Dualism camp on the theories of consciousness topic.


Edit summary : Change name to Functional Property Dualism.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
We are in the Consciousness Arises From Any Equivalent Functional Organization camp on the theories of consciousness topic.


Edit summary : Move data to new theories of consciousness topic.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : In 1995, David Chalmers authored a paper entitled "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" in which he proposes a principle of organizational invariance: "The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system" (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html). He makes his argument through a set of thought experiments involving replacing some or all neurons (he assumes neurons are the fundamental elements of the organization that is the brain but this is not a crucial assumption). He argues that the implausibility of fading or dancing qualia is reason enough to claim that qualia (the stuff of conscious experience) will somehow "arise" from whatever physical matter is abstractly behaving like the neurons, just as it does in the brain. He takes this to mean (contra Searle) that such diverse things as a set of water pipes or an entire population would be conscious if organized correctly. He states his conclusion thus:
"I conclude that by far the most plausible hypothesis is that replacement of neurons while preserving functional organization will preserve qualia, and that experience is wholly determined by functional organization."


Edit summary : Forgot the a in
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
In 1995, David Chalmers authored a paper entitled "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" in which he proposes a principle of organizational invariance: "The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system" (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html). He makes his argument through a set of thought experiments involving replacing some or all neurons (he assumes neurons are the fundamental elements of the organization that is the brain but this is not crucial assumption). He argues that the implausibility of fading or dancing qualia is reason enough to claim that qualia (the stuff of conscious experience) will somehow "arise" from whatever physical matter is abstractly behaving like the neurons, just as it does in the brain. He takes this to mean (contra Searle) that such diverse things as a set of water pipes or an entire population would be conscious if organized correctly. He states his conclusion thus:
"I conclude that by far the most plausible hypothesis is that replacement of neurons while preserving functional organization will preserve qualia, and that experience is wholly determined by functional organization."


Edit summary : Recycling this camp statement.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : The 'hard problem' is to explain why (at least some) "physical" processes are accompanied by phenomenal experience.

Edit summary : You say no one has made a concise statment of the hard problem
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Tjiniman
Go live Time :