Topic: Hard Problem

Camp: Agreement / Approachable Via Science / Representational Qualia / Mind-Brain Identity / Material Property Dualism

Camp Statement History

Objected
Live
In Review
Old
Statement :

Material Property Dualism


We believe that ineffable phenomenal properties are tied to specific matter rather than behavior or functionality.
For more information, see the parallel Material Property Dualism camp in the Theories of Consciousness topic.


Edit summary : Change name to Material Property Dualism.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Property Dualism


We believe that matter has two very different classes of properties.
  1. Cause and effect behavioral properties
  2. Phenomenal properties
For more information, see the parallel Property Dualism camp in the Theories of Consciousness topic.


Edit summary : Consolidate data to theories of consciousness topic.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :

Property Dualism


We believe David Chalmers is pushing in the wrong direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, we will see the behavior of something science has already taught us about. It is just that such abstracted information about behavior will not contain any ineffable information about it, or what it is phenomenally like. And we certainly shouldn't expect it to reflect 700 nm light.
Any causally downstream effect can represent its upstream referent. We might say it can be behaviorally or abstractly "like" it. While at the same time the more important and more primal phenomenal quality is lost, and the downstream effect is nothing phenomenally "like" it. This is precisely the meaning of "ineffable" and why traditional cause and effect observation can't see them, or rather can only see their behavioral effects.
Yet when there is a juicy sweet strawberry in our left field of vision, represented by red in our right hemisphere, we are clearly aware of this because of its difference between whatever it is in our left hemisphere that has a green phenomenal property representing our knowledge of the leaves in our right field of vision. In this way our conscious world is unified, and we are able to "eff" the primal phenomenal difference between them
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. Note 1 This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains, and indeed be able to have our spiritual knowledge escape the ineffable spirit prison walls that are our skulls and discover much more than just the behavior of the elements in this table that make up the spiritual, if you will, universe.
Chalmers argument centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html thought experiment. We accept the Transmigration Fallacy camp that points out how using this argument is mistaken.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument http://www.simulation-argument.com/. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can some how arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says:
"My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements. The idea is that consistently, something like a set of elements, in a specific active neuronal structure, will always have a particular phenomenal property, and that this will be consistently repeatable in other brains, enabling objective "effing" of what they are phenomenally like. And of course these structures will not reflect 700 nm (red) light when the brain surgeon looks at them


Edit summary : New Name: Property Dualism.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : We believe David Chalmers is pushing in the wrong direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, we will see the behavior of something science has already taught us about. It is just that such abstracted information about behavior will not contain any ineffable information about it, or what it is phenomenally like. And we certainly shouldn't expect it to reflect 700 nm light.
Any causally downstream effect can represent its upstream referent. We might say it can be behaviorally or abstractly "like" it. While at the same time the more important and more primal phenomenal quality is lost, and the downstream effect is nothing phenomenally "like" it. This is precisely the meaning of "ineffable" and why traditional cause and effect observation can't see them, or rather can only see their behavioral effects.
Yet when there is a juicy sweet strawberry in our left field of vision, represented by red in our right hemisphere, we are clearly aware of this because of its difference between whatever it is in our left hemisphere that has a green phenomenal property representing our knowledge of the leaves in our right field of vision. In this way our conscious world is unified, and we are able to "eff" the primal phenomenal difference between them
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. Note 1 This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains, and indeed be able to have our spiritual knowledge escape the ineffable spirit prison walls that are our skulls and discover much more than just the behavior of the elements in this table that make up the spiritual, if you will, universe.
Chalmers argument centers around Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html thought experiment. We accept the Transmigration Fallacy camp that points out how using this argument is mistaken.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument http://www.simulation-argument.com/. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can some how arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says:
"My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements. The idea is that consistently, something like a set of elements, in a specific active neuronal structure, will always have a particular phenomenal property, and that this will be consistently repeatable in other brains, enabling objective "effing" of what they are phenomenally like. And of course these structures will not reflect 700 nm (red) light when the brain surgeon looks at them


Edit summary : Move transmigration falacy stuff to its own topic.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : We believe David Chalmers is pushing in the wrong direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, we will see the behavior of something science has already taught us about. It is just that such abstracted information about behavior will not contain any ineffable information about it, or what it is phenomenally like. And we certainly shouldn't expect it to reflect 700 nm light.
Any causally downstream effect can represent its upstream referent. We might say it can be behaviorally or abstractly "like" it. While at the same time the more important and more primal phenomenal quality is lost, and the downstream effect is nothing phenomenally "like" it. This is precisely the meaning of "ineffable" and why traditional cause and effect observation can't see them, or rather can only see their behavioral effects.
Yet when there is a juicy sweet strawberry in our left field of vision, represented by red in our right hemisphere, we are clearly aware of this because of its difference between whatever it is in our left hemisphere that has a green phenomenal property representing our knowledge of the leaves in our right field of vision. In this way our conscious world is unified, and we are able to "eff" the primal phenomenal difference between them
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. Note 1 This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains, and indeed be able to have our spiritual knowledge escape the ineffable spirit prison walls that are our skulls and discover much more than just the behavior of the elements in this table that make up the spiritual, if you will, universe.
Chalmers uses Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html thought experiment to make what many take as a powerful argument for the principle of organizational invariance. You start replacing all the relevant neurons with abstracted silicone counterparts. When you start you have David Chalmers. "The final system, Robot, is in the same situation, processing the same inputs and producing similar behavior, but by hypothesis is experiencing nothing at all." which obviously could not be accurate at all.
There must be something in the robots functionally equivalent mind that is the robots knowledge of the strawberry that is distinguishable from something that is the leaves. One possibility could be a set of ones for red, and a set of zeros for green. So when we ask the robot what red is like, it says (if it is not programmed to lie) it must describe its awareness of red as 1, and its awareness of green to be 0, or whatever abstracted non phenomenal difference achieves the functionally equivalent behavior.
The hypothesis is that whatever it is that has this red property in the system of awareness, when replaced, will be unable to present the same red to the system of unified conscious awareness. Though the behavior could be modeled by using something like abstracted ones and zeros, and perhaps a slightly more complex system to use a lookup table to lie about it being aware of differing red and green phenomenal properties. But certainly any such lying system would in no way be a functionally isomorphic system. And since the primal and phenomenal nature of red and green, and their difference, could not be presented to such a system of unified awareness, when whatever is producing the spot of red is replaced by the silicone equivalent, there must be some kind of vanishing or dancing qualia on that spot of the strawberry in our conscious world of awareness.
If it turns out that it is possible to eff "red" from one side of a brain's hemisphere made of neurons, to an indistinguishable red in a hemisphere made entirely of abstracted behavior running on silicone, then this theory will be proved wrong. We admit such as a possibility. But we believe there will be some type of vanishing, fading, or dancing qualia, and the system will be unable to honestly answer the simple question: what is red like for you, how is it different than green, and it will not be able to give an honest answer that is functionally equivalent on a sufficiently fine grained level.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument http://www.simulation-argument.com/. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can some how arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says:
"My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements. The idea is that consistently, something like a set of elements, in a specific active neuronal structure, will always have a particular phenomenal property, and that this will be consistently repeatable in other brains, enabling objective "effing" of what they are phenomenally like. And of course these structures will not reflect 700 nm (red) light when the brain surgeon looks at them

Edit summary : Add statement about seeing behavior, but not phenomenal.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
We believe David Chalmers is pushing in the wrong direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, certainly we shouldn't expect them to reflect 700 and 500 nm light and so on right?
Any causally downstream effect can represent its upstream referent. We might say it can be behaviorally or abstractly "like" it. While at the same time the more important and more primal phenomenal quality is lost, and the downstream effect is nothing phenomenally "like" it. This is precisely the meaning of "ineffable" and why traditional cause and effect observation can't see them, or rather can only see their behavioral effects.
Yet when there is a juicy sweet strawberry in our left field of vision, represented by red in our right hemisphere, we are clearly aware of this because of its difference between whatever it is in our left hemisphere that has a green phenomenal property representing our knowledge of the leaves in our right field of vision. In this way our conscious world is unified, and we are able to "eff" the primal phenomenal difference between them
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. Note 1 This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains, and indeed be able to have our spiritual knowledge escape the ineffable spirit prison walls that are our skulls and discover much more than just the behavior of the elements in this table that make up the spiritual, if you will, universe.
Chalmers uses Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html thought experiment to make what many take as a powerful argument for the principle of organizational invariance. You start replacing all the relevant neurons with abstracted silicone counterparts. When you start you have David Chalmers. "The final system, Robot, is in the same situation, processing the same inputs and producing similar behavior, but by hypothesis is experiencing nothing at all." which obviously could not be accurate at all.
There must be something in the robots functionally equivalent mind that is the robots knowledge of the strawberry that is distinguishable from something that is the leaves. One possibility could be a set of ones for red, and a set of zeros for green. So when we ask the robot what red is like, it says (if it is not programmed to lie) it must describe its awareness of red as 1, and its awareness of green to be 0, or whatever abstracted non phenomenal difference achieves the functionally equivalent behavior.
The hypothesis is that whatever it is that has this red property in the system of awareness, when replaced, will be unable to present the same red to the system of unified conscious awareness. Though the behavior could be modeled by using something like abstracted ones and zeros, and perhaps a slightly more complex system to use a lookup table to lie about it being aware of differing red and green phenomenal properties. But certainly any such lying system would in no way be a functionally isomorphic system. And since the primal and phenomenal nature of red and green, and their difference, could not be presented to such a system of unified awareness, when whatever is producing the spot of red is replaced by the silicone equivalent, there must be some kind of vanishing or dancing qualia on that spot of the strawberry in our conscious world of awareness.
If it turns out that it is possible to eff "red" from one side of a brain's hemisphere made of neurons, to an indistinguishable red in a hemisphere made entirely of abstracted behavior running on silicone, then this theory will be proved wrong. We admit such as a possibility. But we believe there will be some type of vanishing, fading, or dancing qualia, and the system will be unable to honestly answer the simple question: what is red like for you, how is it different than green, and it will not be able to give an honest answer that is functionally equivalent on a sufficiently fine grained level.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument http://www.simulation-argument.com/. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can some how arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says:
"My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.
Note 1: We suspect any such mapping from something like red will not be to any single atomic element, but likely at a more complex level. Perhaps it will be some type of interference pattern between a set of elements. The idea is that consistently, something like a set of elements, in a specific active neuronal structure, will always have a particular phenomenal property, and that this will be consistently repeatable in other brains, enabling objective "effing" of what they are phenomenally like. And of course these structures will not reflect 700 nm (red) light when the brain surgeon looks at them

Edit summary : Add atomic table note.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : We believe David Chalmers is pushing in the wrong direction in his effort to get a handle on this "hard problem", and that the "Principle of organizational invariance" will turn out to be wrong.
David Chalmers, and others that talk about this hard problem often use the term "physical process" to refer to what physical science tells us about the stuff our brain is made of, and its causes and effects. They contrast this with the subjective nature of our ideas. More often than not, terms like the following are used to relate the two: "arise from", "neural correlate", "results in", "causes", "supervenes on" and so on. We believe all such to be a mistaken terminology leading us away from reality.
We believe the fundamental critical difference, should instead be only focused on the cause and effect behavior, on the scientifically observable side, and the phenomenal qualities on the subjective side. Certainly whatever these are must both be included as physical properties of the universe since the universe, by definition includes all that can be observed and experienced. To say "physical process gives rise to the subjective" is to fail to clearly distinguish between what is really important and the fact that it is all included in the "physical".
We believe that evolution has managed to use something that has a red phenomenal property to represent knowledge of something that reflects 700 nm light, while using something different that has the phenomenal different property, green, to distinguish between and be aware of a different item that reflects 500 nm light. But when we use cause and effect observation techniques to observe whatever it is our brain is using the phenomenal properties of to represent knowledge, certainly we shouldn't expect them to reflect 700 and 500 nm light and so on right?
Any causally downstream effect can represent its upstream referent. We might say it can be behaviorally or abstractly "like" it. While at the same time the more important and more primal phenomenal quality is lost, and the downstream effect is nothing phenomenally "like" it. This is precisely the meaning of "ineffable" and why traditional cause and effect observation can't see them, or rather can only see their behavioral effects.
Yet when there is a juicy sweet strawberry in our left field of vision, represented by red in our right hemisphere, we are clearly aware of this because of its difference between whatever it is in our left hemisphere that has a green phenomenal property representing our knowledge of the leaves in our right field of vision. In this way our conscious world is unified, and we are able to "eff" the primal phenomenal difference between them
Physical sciences have classified natural elements into the periodic table. We know, abstractly, much about the behavior of these individual elements consistently across space, time, temperature, and so on. We believe we will also find phenomenal properties that equally consistently across space and time map into this table. This is why we believe Chalmers is critically mistaken when he claims anything with a fundamental nature like "red" can "arise" from anything as diverse as a properly configured set of water pipes.
Once we learn the process where these phenomenal properties can be unified together into a single world of conscious awareness across multiple hemispheres of our brain, and across time, we will also find ways to share or eff these phenomenal properties between multiple brains, and indeed be able to have our spiritual knowledge escape the ineffable spirit prison walls that are our skulls and discover much more than just the behavior of the elements in this table that make up the spiritual, if you will, universe.
Chalmers uses Hans Moravec's "Transmigration" http://www.leaderu.com/truth/2truth05.html thought experiment to make what many take as a powerful argument for the principle of organizational invariance. You start replacing all the relevant neurons with abstracted silicone counterparts. When you start you have David Chalmers. "The final system, Robot, is in the same situation, processing the same inputs and producing similar behavior, but by hypothesis is experiencing nothing at all." which obviously could not be accurate at all.
There must be something in the robots functionally equivalent mind that is the robots knowledge of the strawberry that is distinguishable from something that is the leaves. One possibility could be a set of ones for red, and a set of zeros for green. So when we ask the robot what red is like, it says (if it is not programmed to lie) it must describe its awareness of red as 1, and its awareness of green to be 0, or whatever abstracted non phenomenal difference achieves the functionally equivalent behavior.
The hypothesis is that whatever it is that has this red property in the system of awareness, when replaced, will be unable to present the same red to the system of unified conscious awareness. Though the behavior could be modeled by using something like abstracted ones and zeros, and perhaps a slightly more complex system to use a lookup table to lie about it being aware of differing red and green phenomenal properties. But certainly any such lying system would in no way be a functionally isomorphic system. And since the primal and phenomenal nature of red and green, and their difference, could not be presented to such a system of unified awareness, when whatever is producing the spot of red is replaced by the silicone equivalent, there must be some kind of vanishing or dancing qualia on that spot of the strawberry in our conscious world of awareness.
If it turns out that it is possible to eff "red" from one side of a brain's hemisphere made of neurons, to an indistinguishable red in a hemisphere made entirely of abstracted behavior running on silicone, then this theory will be proved wrong. We admit such as a possibility. But we believe there will be some type of vanishing, fading, or dancing qualia, and the system will be unable to honestly answer the simple question: what is red like for you, how is it different than green, and it will not be able to give an honest answer that is functionally equivalent on a sufficiently fine grained level.
We believe this theory that nature has fundamental phenomenal properties to have significant implications for Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument http://www.simulation-argument.com/. The idea that we, along with all of our conscious awareness, can some how arise from a "sufficiently fine grained functional isomorph" regardless of how many levels this functional isomorph is above the basement level is problematic. We believe to even think such is to indicate one's lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of phenomenal properties, and their categorical difference from mere cause and effect behavior. We believe such an idea removes these phenomenal properties so far from hard reality that it would make them completely irrelevant and arbitrary.
Stathis Papaioannou says:
"My reading of Chalmers is that working out exactly what the physical basis of a particular phenomenal quality is well enough to transfer or reproduce it at will would still leave the hard problem of why there should be any phenomenal property at all associated with that particular, or any, physical system."
We especially agree with this within any principle of organization invariance theory. Such does indeed seem like an impossible "hard problem". However, within this competing matter has phenomenal properties theory, we instead accept that it is consistently particular matter, in a particular state, that has particular phenomenal properties, and indeed that the cause and effect behaviors our senses are indirectly observing are likely more accurately portrayed as a cause of particular phenomenal properties rather than the other way around. Within this competing theory, not only are things less arbitrary, the why do these phenomenal properties exist is less of a problem than our lack of knowledge of why nature has particular cause and effect behavioral properties at all. We don't know why force more or less equals mass times acceleration. We just accept that it does, without asking why. And that knowledge alone, despite how incomplete it is, is all that is needed to take us to the stars.
Not only that, but phenomenal properties are much more fundamental and epistemologically absolute than all these mere cause and effect behaviors beyond our senses are. For after all, we could be just a brain in a vat where that brain is composed of nothing more than phenomenal properties, while all this mere cause and effect behavior our senses are allegedly reporting to us, might really just only exist in some artificial matrix somewhere, at some arbitrarily distant levels above any basement reality. At the very least, the most primal and absolute of all things is the phenomenal natures of at least part of that brain in that bucket. I think, and that thinking is phenomenal, therefore I am at least phenomenal.



Edit summary : Move less controversial stuff into
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
To date, the physical sciences have only been concerned with the behavior or cause and effect properties of the universe. But we believe there is more to the universe than just behavior. There are also phenomenal properties like red, green, the taste of salt, and so on. These qualities are categorically completely different than mere cause and effect behavior. Our brains use these phenomenal properties to represent conscious information. We know this, and the phenomenal qualities of these properties more than we know a causal world beyond our senses, which our scientific instruments can at best imply exists. Since our scientific instruments and senses are all cause and effect based, these phenomenal properties have so far remained 'ineffable' to cause and effect observation and to other minds. You can't look at the physical behavior of whatever has a red property in our brain when we are looking at 700 nm light, and expect it to reflect 700 nm light. But that does not mean these properties are not objectively reproducible to science and objectively experience-able by others in merged and shared brains (like our right and left hemisphere are merged). Once you discover the behavioral "neural correlate" that reliably has these same phenomenal properties in everyone's mind and why, you will be able to reproduce the same set of physical state, that has this phenomenal property, in another's mind, and effectively, reliably, scientifically "eff" to the other mind these phenomenal qualities of nature; as in "Oh THAT is what salt tastes like".
To say such phenomenal properties are merely an "illusion" is a categorical mistake, since an "illusion" is conscious knowledge that does not properly represent its referent. The nature of phenomenal properties has nothing to do with such mappings, how accurately they represent their referent, who uses different ones to represent the same referent, and so on. Conscious knowledge just is, and even if it is mistaken in what it represents, this does not change its phenomenal nature and what it is fundamentally and absolutely like.
There is an intuitive argument that many think proves there can be no "phenomenal properties" or that such is irrelevant or meaningless. Hans Moravec has described this idea and called it "Transmigration". In this thought experiment neurons are replaced, one at a time, with artificial abstract simulators producing the same "behavior" as the original on the rest of the brain. Once all the neurons are replaced with the abstract simulation of the behavior, the result will be, behaviorally, indistinguishable from the original. Chalmers has a paper related to this here: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html. If Chalmer's principle of organizational invariance turns out to be true, there must be some way that phenomenal properties arise from any old causal behavior (set of water pipes, our a large crowd of Chinese are examples) such that this type of effing we believe to be possible, can still be done. Despite Chalmers arguments to the contrary, we believe finding a resolution such that his principle of organizational invariance is maintained, is much more of a "hard problem" then simply finding some other way for phenomenal properties to exist as a property of some existing causal neural correlate. We believe the most fruitful path to peruse is to come up with some way such that fading or dancing qualia, or some other odd subjective phenomenal behavior, will start to occur when the causal correlate is replaced, that can only be resolved by using the correct causal neural correlate that has a the right phenomenal property.
There are crude models we can imagine that can lead us to believe in this universe having phenomenal properties possibility. One physical possibility could work with a set of neurons in the primary visual cortex. We can imagine each neuron in this set representing a volume element (or voxel or a 3D pixel) in the 3D space that is the world of our phenomenal special awareness. The pattern all such neurons fire with could represent what we are looking at and be produced by the data coming from the eye in the optic nerve. Such a model is described by Steve Lehar http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/.
Perhaps we are looking at a field of green strawberry leaves, in the center of which is a bright red strawberry. In such a system there would be a literal 3D model of these green leaves, with the red strawberry represented by this set of neurons, with each neuron representing a single 3D volume element of this conscious awareness. Surely this would not be reality, but in some possible universe, individual neural transmitters could be what have the color phenomenal properties we are aware of. So let's say neural transmitter R is what has the red phenomenal property, and neural transmitter G has the green phenomenal property. Within this set of neurons, each of the ones in the space where there is a green leaf surface is firing with the G neural transmitter. The ones in the volume space that is the surface of the strawberry are firing with the R neural transmitter.
Lets take one of the neurons at the center of the surface of the red strawberry and attempt to replace it with a piece of abstracted silicone processing. Perhaps we could include the multiple axon terminals and all the downstream synapses where the R neural transmitters that have the red phenomenal property are firing since in this case this is what we are imagining could have the red phenomenal property in our conscious knowledge.
If our theory that it is the R neural transmitter that has this red phenomenal property is true, attempting to replace it with abstracted silicone processing that reproduces the same behavior or awareness in this conscious model will turn out to be very difficult. Initial attempts could theoretically produce absent qualia in that volume space of our awareness which of course would be various obvious to the one experiencing this. Follow on attempts could produce fading, inverted or dancing qualia as we start to get close to what is really required to reproducing the true phenomenal property at that point on the surface of the strawberry in our conscious awareness.
Our phenomenal awareness of the difference between red and green, and how this is all brought together in the unified spatial and temporal knowledge with the green leaves, is obviously a big part of our knowledge about the strawberry in the patch of leaves. If our theory is correct, the abstract numbers being propagated by the silicon gates will have to do the additional work to convince all the downstream systems that this volume contains a red phenomenal property. In essence, the silicone abstractions will have to "lie" to their downstream counterparts in order to reproduce the same kind of behavior that the R neural transmitter naturally has. This could include very sophisticated systems trying to get the parts that once naturally knew what red is like, so that they two could propagate the lie in order to maintain the same behavior of picking and eating the strawberry.
Of course we are obviously very ignorant about actual neural behavior and surely the above model is nothing like real neurons or any 2 neural transmitters. And such a model still suffers from some of the problems Chalmers is attempting to point out. But if we can imagine some logical possibility such as this, then doesn't this open the door that some neural correlate in our brain could have similar problems as we attempt to replace them with abstracted silicone representations? We certainly believe this to be a strong possibility, and indeed a much easier problem to solve than the truly "hard" problem of finding some way for phenomenal properties to "arise" from a set of water pipes as must be possible if the "principle of organization invariance" turns out to be true.
We believe science is on the verge of resolving this "Hard Problem" one way or another. We believe such scientifically demonstrable understanding will be considered the greatest scientific achievement to date. We believe this will also by far have a greater drastic world changing effect than any other technical achievement to date.
We believe the Turing test to be absurd on this issue. The only important question one should ask is something more like: "What is red like?" And you must be able to eff to properly answer such.


Edit summary : Add a silly theoretical model of a neural corelate.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
To date, the physical sciences have only been concerned with the behavior or cause and effect properties of the universe. But we believe there is more to the universe than just behavior. There are also phenomenal properties like red, green, the taste of salt, and so on. These qualities are categorically completely different than mere cause and effect behavior. Our brains use these phenomenal properties to represent conscious information. We know this, and the phenomenal qualities of these properties more than we know a causal world beyond our senses, which our scientific instruments can at best imply exists. Since our scientific instruments and senses are all cause and effect based, these phenomenal properties have so far remained 'ineffable' to cause and effect observation and to other minds. You can't look at the physical behavior of whatever has a red property in our brain when we are looking at 700 nm light, and expect it to reflect 700 nm light. But that does not mean these properties are not objectively reproducible to science and objectively experience-able by others in merged and shared brains (like our right and left hemisphere are merged). Once you discover the behavioral "neural correlate" that reliably has these same phenomenal properties in everyone's mind and why, you will be able to reproduce the same set of physical state, that has this phenomenal property, in another's mind, and effectively, reliably, scientifically "eff" to the other mind these phenomenal qualities of nature. As in "Oh THAT is what salt tastes like".
To say such phenomenal properties are merely an "illusion" is a categorical mistake, since an "illusion" is conscious knowledge that does not properly represent its referent. The nature of phenomenal properties has nothing to do with such mappings, how accurately they represent their referent, who uses different ones to represent the same referent, and so on. Conscious knowledge just is, and even if it is mistaken in what it represents, this does not change its phenomenal nature and what it is fundamentally and absolutely like.
There is an intuitive argument that many think proves there can be no "phenomenal properties" or that such is irrelevant or meaningless. Hans Moravec has described this idea and called it "Transmigration". In this thought experiment neurons are replaced, one at a time, with artificial abstract simulators producing the same "behavior" as the original on the rest of the brain. Once all the neurons are replaced with the abstract simulation of the behavior, the result will be, behaviorally, indistinguishable from the original. Chalmers has a paper related to this here: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html. If Chalmer's principle of organizational invariance turns out to be true, there must be some way that phenomenal properties arise from any old causal behavior (set of water pipes, our a large crowd of Chinese are examples) such that this type of effing we believe to be possible, can still be done. Despite Chalmers arguments to the contrary, we believe finding a resolution such that his principle of organizational invariance is maintained, is much more of a "hard problem" then simply finding some other way for phenomenal properties to exist as a property of some existing causal neural correlate. We believe the most fruitful path to peruse is to come up with some way such that fading or dancing qualia, or some other odd subjective phenomenal behavior, will start to occur when the causal correlate is replaced, that can only be resolved by using the correct causal neural correlate that has a the right phenomenal property.
Chalmer's terminology leads us to believe he is arguing for something other than, and fails to see the possibility of nature having the kinds of phenomenal properties we believe exist. For example he uses phrases such as "organizational invariance" or "functionally identical". But one could consider "phenomenal" properties to be part of the "function". We believe a better term would be "behaviorally identical" since the cause and effect behavior of matter is not sufficient to account for ineffable "phenomenal properties" of the same that could also exist in addition to the behavioral properties.
We believe science is on the verge of resolving this "Hard Problem" one way or another. We believe such scientifically demonstrable understanding will be considered the greatest scientific achievement to date, and this will also by far have a greater effect on the world than any other technical achievement to date.
We believe that this realization, such scientific experiences, the mapping of such to their neural correlates, and the things we will technically be able to do as a result, will be, by far, the greatest scientific discovery to date and also have the most profound world changing effect to date. The Turing test is absurd on this issue. The only important question one should ask is something more like: "What is red like?" And you must be able to eff to properly answer such.



Edit summary : Fix embarasing misunderstanding about priniciple of invariance.
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement :
To date, science has mostly only been concerned with the behavior or cause and effect of the universe. But we believe there is more to the universe than just behavior. There are also phenomenal properties like red, green, the taste of salt, and so on. These qualities are categorically completely different than mere cause and effect behavior. Our brains use these phenomenal properties to represent conscious information. We know this, and the phenomenal qualities of these properties more than we know a causal world beyond our senses, which our scientific instruments can at best imply exists. Since our scientific instruments and senses are all cause and effect based, these phenomenal properties have so far remained 'ineffable' to cause and effect observation and to other minds. You can't look at the physical behavior of whatever has a red property in our brain when we are looking at 700 nm light, and expect it to reflect 700 nm light. But that does not mean these properties are not objectively reproducible to science and objectively experiencible by others in merged and shared brains (like our right and left hemisphere are merged). Once you discover the behavioral "neural correlate" that reliably has these same phenomenal properties in everyone's mind and why, you will be able to reproduce the same set of physical state, that has this phenomenal property, in another's mind, and effectively, reliably, scientifically "eff" to the other mind these phenomenal qualities of nature. As in "Oh THAT is what salt tastes like".
To say such phenomenal properties are merely an "illusion" is a categorical mistake, since an "illusion" is conscious knowledge that does not properly represent its referent. The nature of phenomenal properties has nothing to do with such mappings, how accurately they represent their referent, who uses different ones to represent the same referent, and so on. Conscious knowledge just is, and even if it is mistaken in what it represents, this does not change its phenomenal nature and what it is fundamentally and absolutely like.
There is an intuitive argument that many think proves there can be no "phenomenal properties" or that such is irrelevant or meaningless. Hans Moravec has described this idea and called it "Transmigration". In this thought experiment neurons are replaced, one at a time, with artificial abstract simulators producing the same "behavior" as the original on the rest of the brain. Once all the neurons are replaced with the abstract simulation of the behavior, the result will be, behaviorally, indistinguishable from the original. Chalmers has a paper related to this here: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html. We believe that Chalmer's principle of organizational invariance will turn out to be true, and that as you replace the neurons you will get some type of experiential change in the mind going through this such as fading qualia or inverted qualia.
We believe that this realization, such scientific experiences, the mapping of such to their neural correlates, and the things we will technically be able to do as a result, will be, by far, the greatest scientific discovery to date and also have the most profound world changing effect to date. The Turing test is absurd on this issue. The only important question one should ask is something more like: "What is red like?" And you must be able to eff to properly answer such.



Edit summary : Make appropriate changes proposed by Stathis
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :
Statement : To date, science has mostly only been concerned with the behavior or cause and effect of the universe. But we believe there is more to the universe than just behavior. There are also phenomenal properties like red, green, the taste of salt, and so on. These qualities are categorically completely different than mere cause and effect behavior. Our brains use these phenomenal properties to represent conscious information. We know this, and the phenomenal qualities of these properties more than we know a causal world beyond our senses, which our scientific instruments can at best imply exists. Since our scientific instruments and senses are all cause and effect based, these phenomenal properties have so far remained 'ineffable' to cause and effect observation and to other minds. You can't look at the physical behavior of whatever has a red property in our brain when we are looking at 700 nm light, and expect it to reflect 700 nm light. But that does not mean these properties are not objectively reproducible to science and objectively experiencible by others in merged and shared brains (like our right and left hemisphere are merged). Once you discover the behavioral "neural correlate" that reliably has these same phenomenal properties in everyone's mind and why, you will be able to reproduce the same set of physical state, that has this phenomenal property, in another's mind, and effectively, reliably, scientifically "eff" to the other mind these phenomenal qualities of nature. As in "Oh THAT is what salt tastes like".
To say such phenomenal properties are merely an "illusion" is a categorical mistake, since an "illusion" is conscious knowledge that does not properly represent its referent. The nature of phenomenal properties has nothing to do with such mappings, how accurately they represent their referent, who uses different ones to represent the same referent, and so on. Conscious knowledge just is, and even if it is mistaken in what it represents, this does not change its phenomenal nature.
There is an intuitive argument that many think proves there can be no "phenomenal properties" or that such is irrelevant or meaningless. Hans Moravec has described this idea and called it "transmigration". In his thought experiment neurons are replaced, one at a time, with artificial simulators producing the same "behavior" as the original on the rest of the brain. Once all the neurons are replaced with the simulation, the result will therefore be behaviorally indistinguishable from the original. David Chalmers has a paper related to this (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) which shows that if the simulation can perfectly reproduce the physical properties of the brain, then it must also perfectly reproduce the phenomenal properties; otherwise, an extreme form of dualism would hold, in which phenomenal properties have no relationship to physical properties.
We believe that this realization, such scientific experiences, the mapping of such to their neural correlates, and the things we will technically be able to do as a result, will be, by far, the greatest scientific discovery to date and also have the most profound world changing effect to date. The Turing test is absurd on this issue. The only important question one should ask is something more like: "What is red like?" And you must be able to eff to properly answer such.




Edit summary : revision
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Stathis
Go live Time :
Object Reason : Interely changes meaning of statement to different POV.
Objector Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Statement :
To date, science has mostly only been concerned with the behavior or cause and effect of the universe. But we believe there is more to the universe than just behavior. There are also phenomenal properties like red, green, the taste of salt, and so on. These qualities are categorically completely different than mere cause and effect behavior. Our brains use these phenomenal properties to represent conscious information. We know this, and the phenomenal qualities of these properties more than we know a causal world beyond our senses, which our scientific instruments can at best imply exists. Since our scientific instruments and senses are all cause and effect based, these phenomenal properties have so far remained 'ineffable' to cause and effect observation and to other minds. You can't look at the physical behavior of whatever has a red property in our brain when we are looking at 700 nm light, and expect it to reflect 700 nm light. But that does not mean these properties are not objectively reproducible to science and objectively experiencible by others in merged and shared brains (like our right and left hemisphere are merged). Once you discover the behavioral "neural correlate" that reliably has these same phenomenal properties in everyone's mind and why, you will be able to reproduce the same set of physical state, that has this phenomenal property, in another's mind, and effectively, reliably, scientifically "eff" to the other mind these phenomenal qualities of nature. As in "Oh THAT is what salt tastes like".
To say such phenomenal properties are merely an "illusion" is a categorical mistake. Since an "illusion" is conscious knowledge that does not properly represent its referent. The nature of phenomenal properties has nothing to do with such mappings, how accurate they represent their referent, who uses different ones to represent the same referent, and so on. Conscious knowledge just is, and even if it is mistaken or different about what it represents, doesn't change its phenomenal nature and what it is fundamentally and absolutely like.
There is an intuitive argument that many think proves there can be no "phenomenal properties" or that such is irrelevant or meaningless. Hans Moravec has described this idea and called it "Transmigration". In this theory neurons are replaced, one at a time, with artificial abstract simulators producing the same "behavior" as the original on the rest of the brain. Once all the neurons are replaced with the abstract simulation of the behavior, the result will be, behaviorally, indistinguishable from the original. Chalmers has a paper related to this here: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html. We believe that Chalmer's principle of organizational invariance will turn out to be true, and that as you replace the neurons you will get some type of experiential change in the mind going through this such as fading qualia or inverted qualia.
We believe that this realization, such scientific experiences, the mapping of such to their neural correlates, and the things we will technically be able to do as a result, will be, by far, the greatest scientific discovery to date and also have the most profound world changing effect to date. The Turing test is absurd on this issue. The only important question one should ask is something more like: "What is red like?" And you must be able to eff to properly answer such.




Edit summary : First Version
Submitted on :
Submitter Nick Name : Brent_Allsop
Go live Time :