Are you Quality Blind?

Naturally, people use one abstract word like ‘red’ to represent anything to do with red information. If your language does this, it can’t represent different physical qualities that may be representing red information. If a language or theory doesn’t have the ability to distinguish between different physical representations of colored information, it is ‘quality blind’.

All of today's peer reviewed physics on color is color quality blind' in this way. The only thing people know about color qualities is the qualities things seem to be. A description of redness is not redness. Text, alone, cannot communicate what redness is like. Nobody can tell us which of all our descriptions of physical stuff is a description of subjective redness. Physicists simply haven’t yet connected (provided a physical dictionary for) our objective descriptions of stuff in the brain with the qualities of stuff we can subjectively directly apprehend as conscious knowledge.

Here are some Socratic questions dealing with various implications of being color quality blind.

1.  Which one is not like the other?
2.  Do you distinguish between reality and knowledge of reality? 
3.  Is Consciousness Dualistic?
4.  If you are consciously aware of something, must there be something, physical, that is that knowledge?
5.  Do you only use one abstract word for all things red?
6.  Is it the strawberry that has an intrinsically red quality, or the reflected light? 
7.  Can Qualia be Mistaken?
8.  What color is the light reflecting off of the strawbery?
9.  Can experimentalists use one word for all things representing red, when attempting to objectively observe qualia?
10.  Is it possible to eff the ineffable nature of qualia?
11.  If an experimentalist wants to objectively observe an elemental redness quale what should they be attempting to observe?
12.  If scientists developed a device that could detect or observe qualia in the brain, what would the data from such a machine be like?
13.  Are there issues with the ways experimentalists observe color experience in the brain?
14.  Can any scientists, including physicists or neuroscientists, tell us the intrinsic color of anything?
15.  Which of these systems would you consider to be conscious?

Are you Qualia Blind?

Naturally, people use one abstract word like ‘red’ to represent anything to do with red information. If your language does this, it can’t represent different physical qualities that may be representing red information. If a language or theory doesn’t have the ability to distinguish between different physical representations of colored information, it is ‘qualia blind’.

All of today's peer reviewed physics on color is 'qualia blind' in this way. The only thing people know about color is the colors things seem to be. A description of redness is not redness. Text, alone, cannot communicate what redness is like. Nobody can tell us which of all our descriptions of physical stuff is a description of subjective redness. Physicists simply haven’t yet connected (provided a physical dictionary for) our objective descriptions of stuff in the brain with the qualities of stuff we can subjectively directly apprehend as conscious knowledge.

Here are some Socratic questions dealing with various implications of being qualia blind.

1.  Which one is not like the other?
2.  Do you distinguish between reality and knowledge of reality? 
3.  Is Consciousness Dualistic?
4.  If you are consciously aware of something, must there be something, physical, that is that knowledge?
5.  Do you only use one abstract word for all things red?
6.  Is it the strawberry that has an intrinsically red quality, or the reflected light? 
7.  Can Qualia be Mistaken?
8.  What color is the light reflecting off of the strawbery?
9.  Can experimentalists use one word for all things representing red, when attempting to objectively observe qualia?
10.  Is it possible to eff the ineffable nature of qualia?
11.  If an experimentalist wants to objectively observe an elemental redness quale what should they be attempting to observe?
12.  If scientists developed a device that could detect or observe qualia in the brain, what would the data from such a machine be like?
13.  Are there issues with the ways experimentalists observe color experience in the brain?
14.  Can any scientists, including physicists or neuroscientists, tell us the intrinsic color of anything?
15.  Which of these systems would you consider to be conscious?

Are you Qualia Blind?

Naturally, people use one abstract word like ‘red’ to represent anything to do with red information. If your language does this, it can’t represent different physical qualities that may be representing red information. If a language or theory doesn’t have the ability to distinguish between different physical representations of colored information, it is ‘qualia blind’.



All of today's peer reviewed physics on color is 'qualia blind' in this way. The only thing people know about color is the colors things seem to be. A description of redness is not redness. Text, alone, cannot communicate what redness is like. Nobody can tell us which of all our descriptions of physical stuff is a description of subjective redness. Physicists simply haven’t yet connected (provided a physical dictionary for) our objective descriptions of stuff in the brain with the qualities of stuff we can subjectively directly apprehend as conscious knowledge.



Here are some Socratic questions dealing with various implications of being qualia blind.

1.  Which one is not like the other?
2.  Do you distinguish between reality and knowledge of reality? 
3.  Is Consciousness Dualistic?
4.  If you are consciously aware of something, must there be something, physical, that is that knowledge?
5.  Do you only use one abstract word for all things red?
6.  Is it the strawberry that has an intrinsically red quality, or the reflected light? 
7.  Can Qualia be Mistaken?
8.  What color is the light reflecting off of the strawbery?
9.  Can experimentalists use one word for all things representing red, when attempting to objectively observe qualia?
10.  Is it possible to eff the ineffable nature of qualia?
11.  If an experimentalist wants to objectively observe an elemental redness quale what should they be attempting to observe?
12.  If scientists developed a device that could detect or observe qualia in the brain, what would the data from such a machine be like?
13.  Are there issues with the ways experimentalists observe color experience in the brain?
14.  Can any scientists, including physicists or neuroscientists, tell us the intrinsic color of anything?
15.  Which of these systems would you consider to be conscious?