HiWy Q,

Thanks for your contribution to this topic, and welcome to Canonizer.

When you say: “consciousness is not a supernatural entity that precedes matter but an intrinsic property of Nature”, how is this different than panpsychist theories, such as“Panexperientialism-2”,

Also“Representational Qualia Theory” defines consciousness to be computationally bound qualities.  It sounds like you are saying that things that make up consciousness (like subjective redness) are an intrinsic property of something in nature, as it predicts in"Qualia are Physical Qualities".  So it seems to me, this doctrine is already contained in that camp?  Or am I missing something?

P.S.  If you don't mind, I'm gong to add a text title to the camp statement, as is standard.  When you see that proposed change, if you approve it, it will go live instantly, other wise, it will take 24 your before it goes live, if no supporters object to it.