Hi John, Looks like an exciting paper. I'm just getting started digesting it. For those interested, here is a direct link to the abstract: http://www.frontiersin.org/Integrative_Neuroscience/10.3389/fnint.2012.00053/abstract I'm not the greatest in brain anatomy, so as I get started on this, I'm wishing for a good online graphical anatomy source that will help me see the locations of the structures in the brain that are being referred to here. Does anyone have a favorite online source they go to for such purposes? Thanks Brent Allsop

Hi Brent! Glad to hear that Dan Dennett is with us again! Now may be the time to comment on his dictum that "There is no place in the brain where it all comes together." Recent advances in neuroscience suggest that this is not the case. All members are referred to a paper we have just published in "Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience" that may be accessed on line as Smythies J, Edelstein L and Ramachandran V (2012) Hypotheses relating to the function of the claustrum. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:53. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00053 This paper further develops the theory put forward by Francis Crick and Christof Koch in 2005 that it is the claustrum that provides this 'place'. They suggested that the claustrum integrates the NCCs "like the conductor of an orchestra", but they did not detail a specific mechanism that does this. Our hypothesis supplies this detailed mechanism, that has to do with the integration of synchronized gamma oscillations (see our paper for details). These may be the long sought after NCCs. John

Theoreticians, How about that, we have received some gracious responses from Daniel Dennett. In one he provided a reference to [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaCedh4Dfs4 his recent talk] at the "Evolution and Function of Consciousness" conference. He indicated that he talks about the issue we raised in the open letter in that talk. He also describes there an update to his multiple drafts model, which I think is enough to start a 'camp' with - especially since James (and others) seem to agree that this is very much like their way of thinking about consciousness. This talk is very convincing to me, that he is (at least now, thanks to Lehar's work?) very much a representationalist, not a direct perceptionist as some of us have assumed (I point a few of the time references in the video which prove such in the proposed Dennett statement google doc below). He very much accepts how powerful arguments are for Dualism, yet just like James, warns us against going down that path, for not quite as good as reasons as James provides (in my opinion) I think we could get his camp started just like we started Hameroff's Orch OR theory camp. Just like you gracious supporters of Hameroff showed up to help his noble effort. Hameroff thought his camp was far less popular than it now demonstrably is, and it seems that Dennett thinks his camp has become far less popular than I bet it is, despite his up till now disinterest. I'm betting that more supporters will soon show up to support what is surely a far more popular camp than he thinks, despite his absence. Dennett also talks about tactics in this field, that losing interest in publishing for a time was a tactical mistake. I'm hoping we can quickly demonstrate to him the power of the amplification of the wisdom of the crowd canonizer tactics. Whenever I give a talk, I always ask what people think. If they support the ideas, I ask them to support the camps that represent them. And if they think differently, I ask everyone to 'canonize' such, so if there really is something to such, we can all better understand, concisely and quantitatively, just what that is. Surely, if anyone as popular as Dennett did anything like this, as they gave talks and published papers, (instead of wasting so much time focusing on non consensus sloppy thinking like "access vs phenomenal consciousness") they could likely quickly push their camp to the top of the consensus ladder, at least for a time, since ultimately everything depends on scientific reality. Anyway, towards that end, I propose we start a sub camp of Representational Functionalism called "Dennett's Predictive Bayesian Coding Theory" and I have started a proposed Google doc statement here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RFwEiuJ2VI_NQOJd3DfkUGifo6L0GGq1z46z4T4i5wc/edit I'm betting that James will think about as much of this proposed camp statement (and name?) as I thought of one of his proposal of property dualism (though such was a great help for me in concisely formulating what we have now). So I'm hoping he and others can turn this into a much better version from their perspective. Then, hopefully, we can run this by Dennett, one final time, before we canonize it? James and or Michal or anyone, would you be willing to support such a camp to at least get it started? Looking forward to finding out what everyone thinks. It's so great to finally get some real support in this very important camp!! Thanks all!! Upwards, Brent Allsop

Brent "I think computation can ... cause the robot to choose to pick the strawberry." Indeed, but what has this to do with consciousness? "We, on the other hand, are still doing similar computation." No, the brain is not a computer: look at the construction and activity of each - very different. Yes, both i and a suitable equipped robot can distinguish a strawberry from the background but the process is radically different. If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck but is a robot then it's a robot and not a duck. "Our brain is just also running our computations on top of phenomenal natures..." I don't believe in a phenomenal substrate to the world: as i've said before, my view is that consciousness arises in brains or similar systems and so panpsychism is false. "It sounds like you think differently, in that consciousness is something, different, entirely, from any kind of computation?" True. If you consult my camp statement you'll see that i differentiate between computer VR and brain VR: 'The brain is not a computer running software that represents the world. Computational functionalism is false: nothing in or about a computer simulation could be conscious.' "What, exactly, do you think this 'virtual reality' world of your theory is made of," I am working on the theory that it is an electro-magnetic phenomenon. "and what causes it to choose the red ones over the green ones," I choose, it doesn't. The clue is in the camp title: "Self-centred virtual reality in the brain". "and how is this not computation – though it is phenomenal computation, not just abstracted causal computation?" What is phenomenal about computation? Surely phenomenal computation is a contradiction in terms?

Craig Yes, we both think computational functionalism is false. "when you say that something is delectable or that it is a fruit, we are looking at the thing retrospectively from our own human/mammalian/animal view of the world." I agree. These are subjective - in our minds, not in the strawberry. "In a universe where strawberries were the only living organisms, it would be much more likely IMO that soil would be delectable..." I don't agree that the strawberry plant finds nutrients from the soil delectable as it is not conscious. "Water and sugar are molecular arrangements of atoms which have no particular meaning unless they are part of some view of the world which reads them as meaningfully patterned atoms." Well, i agree that meaning is something for us and not molecules but the tree is in the quad whether we observe it or not. "Otherwise they are nothing but nano-pinpoints of mass clinging together out of mathematical habit," No, maths is our doing. "...with no macro level of description at all. They move around at different speeds, break apart, stick together, etc, but at no point does it become a given that these 'arrangements' exist as identifiable wholes in and of themselves." I don't understand what you mean. "My conclusion then is that all possible descriptions and identities on all levels can be nothing other than qualia." So, you're a follower of Berkeley.

Theoreticians, As you probably noticed, I've submitted the proposals for the "Dualism" camp structure changes as we discussed. I've also submitted a quick and dirty draft of a statement for the "Substance Dualism" camp. You substance dualism people can probably do a much better job at a statement, than me. You can see how these proposed changes will appear once they go live, if you set the "As of" value on the side bar to include review. And here are the links to all of the Google docs statements being proposed, which we can submit once they are agreed on, and after the structural changes go live. * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yKglpMLAzagRghpCNSzZzxS9FJ-uhg96nb1kBnBk9AA/edit Representational Qualia Theory] * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aDRRFW_lr7FMwSqOQHTP02Rd7za5lvQG3cdhQ69Ya5Q/edit Dualism] * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gginaif0YTvDVSwFF7V_wRei-SDZlelt0LPIc5I_gD8/edit Property Dualism] * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dii95g7CYV04fe2jMzwLNHk2E68bfIor8HqAaouDrAM/edit Substance Dualism] * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dogSoCsouz2RhQ-CTNjtnYJ8Xr6JILNDki5Kn_met_o/edit Material Property Dualism] * [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1V03WBMSY5cKf97NoM6KPZSKtxEEHg5MZJfb6FPq0Ui0/edit Macro Material Property Dualism] Upwards, Brent Allsop

Rich, This is interesting. You stated: "computational functionalism - the theory that consciousness is some form of computation - is false." I think I disagree with this, but I'm not sure what this implies you think consciousness is so let me see if I can get you to help me understand your thinking on this. I think computation can be done on top of any fundamental natures of reality; 'causal properties' being one of the two types of fundamental natures. Current Computers all run on these types of properties, exclusively (as in nothing is dependent on any phenomenal natures), in abstracted ways. In other words, a set of causal properties, such as a group of wires with either zero or 5 volts can be interpreted as a string of bits, which in turn can be interpreted as a pattern of 0xFF0000, which in turn can be interpreted as 'red' which in turn can be interpreted as a property of a strawberry. And this pattern of causal properties, can then, because of this interpretation, cause the robot to choose to pick the strawberry. To me, that is all computation. We, on the other hand, are still doing similar computation. Our brain is just also running our computations on top of phenomenal natures, not just causal natures exclusively. In other words, in the last example, it was the set of wires with 0xFF0000 pattern of voltages that was causing the computational system to choose to pick the strawberry. While we, on the other hand, are choosing to pick the strawberry because of its redness phenomenal quality. In other words, it is this redness nature that is causing the computational system to pick the strawberry. Robot computation is entirely based on abstracted information. The only thing that needs to know anything about fundamental natures, are the transducers that cause one representation to transducer to the next causally downstream abstracted representation. While for us, the fundamental natures are part of the algorithm, and it is because we know what it is fundamentally like, i.e. redness, that we make the computational action of picking it. It sounds like you think differently, in that consciousness is something, different, entirely, from any kind of computation? While I think there are fundamental natures that systems can use to build consciousness and computation out of, while perhaps you think consciousness somehow arises from some causal process very different than any kind of computation or something? What, exactly, do you think this 'virtual reality' world of your theory is made of, and what causes it to choose the red ones over the green ones, and how is this not computation – though it is phenomenal computation, not just abstracted causal computation? Brent Allsop

Richwil, We seem to be on the same page as far as a simulation not being able to experience the qualia of the system that it is supposed to simulate. Where I differ is that while you say of a strawberry's proposed non-qualitative nature, you say "No. It is a delectable fruit composed of water, sugars and so on. ", I see that this is an arbitrary distinction. What I mean by that is that when you say that something is delectable or that it is a fruit, we are looking at the thing retrospectively from our own human/mammalian/animal view of the world. Not everything can eat fruit, so there is no reason to believe that the distinction between fruit, vegetable, mineral, delectableness, etc could exist in the absence of an entity which could potentially be interested in eating the thing. In a universe where strawberries were the only living organisms, it would be much more likely IMO that soil would be delectable and the idea of a fruit would have no meaning. If we are to understand consciousness we cannot fail to include the prospective view - starting from the ground up of a universe without consciousness. As to the next level of description of 'water' and 'sugars', this is a bit more challenging to view prospectively but the idea is the same. Water and sugar are molecular arrangements of atoms which have no particular meaning unless they are part of some view of the world which reads them as meaningfully patterned atoms. Otherwise they are nothing but nano-pinpoints of mass clinging together out of mathematical habit, with no macro level of description at all. They move around at different speeds, break apart, stick together, etc, but at no point does it become a given that these 'arrangements' exist as identifiable wholes in and of themselves. Going down further of course, the atoms themselves are what? Charged tendencies to exist? Exist as what? Potentials for qualitative elaboration? My conclusion then is that all possible descriptions and identities on all levels can be nothing other than qualia. Nothing is anything except the total of all possible experiences of what it seems to be (to itself and to everything else). Panpsychism, or pan-experientialism is the only way I can see that really makes sense as we can get an appearance of dumbed down reality by inhibiting sensitivity or flattening qualitative depth, but we cannot make reality more intelligent by moving dumb components around in more elaborate circles. Anyone getting more of an idea of what I am talking about? Craig

Brent So, as i understand you (post #186), you started off with substance dualism and proceeded to property dualism via Cartesian dualism? Yes, i believe that the NCC is exclusively brain (or similar system) activity so all the varieties of panpsychism are mistaken IMO. "Let me ask you if you think there is any possibility that there is more to the surface of the strawberry, than just its ability to behave in a way that it reflects 650 NM light?" Of course: it has many properties, not just interaction with light. "Is the strawberry in any way ineffably qualitative or phenomenal?" No. It is a delectable fruit composed of water, sugars and so on. "Obviously, we both agree that something in the brain has more than just behavior which can be simulated, right?" So we agree that computational functionalism - the theory that consciousness is some form of computation - is false? There is a range of computer simulations of aspects of neurons and neural networks which more or less replicate measurements taken from the brain and they are being improved all the time as are the instruments of measurement. A simulation, however accurate and comprehensive, is just a bunch of equations churning out numbers that match the numbers coming out of measuring instruments. The point is that simulation is not the system being simulated: only the system has qualia.

Excellent idea all round Brent! John