Glen asked: "How does you theory explain illusions such as the moon illusion?" Lenny responds: My ABC model is based on a theory of cosmogenesis, consciousness and mind and how they function interactively, not a theory of psychology per se. However, it postulates that human zero-point consciousness is separate and independent of brain, body, senses, etc., and is the awareness of individual self as well as the sole perceiver, discerner, discriminator, thinker, chooser, decider, actor, etc. And that the shortest term mind and short and long term memory are separate fields that carry both the immediate perceived sensory image information and the past learned, species, archetypal, or total knowledge information. Therefore, the moon illusion—like all illusions that require comparison between the image perceived in the mind with the simultaneously recalled memory of past images recorded in long term memory—is simply a subjective decision of conscious awareness to compensate for perspective differences or size and color relationships between different objects in the immediate field of view and learned perspectives and object sizes and colors in past viewed images. Since the remembered images compared are in the fields of mind-memory, rather than in the present outside world, the conscious choice of the experience of qualia could be considered as both representational and causatively behavioral. Obviously, the wakeful conscious or unconscious perceiver, as the chooser of the illusion, is also the willful or intentional source of the behavioral response to the selected qualia perceived. Now, I ask Glen; How can behavioral psychology explain the Moon illusion without resorting to a visual representation of the image of perception in the mind between the conscious perceiver and the object of perception?

Brent writes: Glen, Ah, very good question. Is this question also as big a problem for behaviorists, as it is for other theories like all direct perception or naive realism theories? Glen responds: Is it a problem? Or is it a problem posed by straw men? Seeing (or hearing etc.) for both behaviorists and "embodied cognitivists" (at least the ones that I have read) is behavior, and behavior is elicited or engendered by stimuli and it is (sometimes) altered by its consequences, but behavior is not the antecedent stimulus, nor is it somehow structurally related to it. The point here is that there is absolutely nothing troublesome to the "direct perception" people, that I know, that what we report when we engage in the behavior called seeing is at odds with what we might say when we have intercourse with the stimuli in some other fashion. There is nothing particularly troubling when, after looking at (which is behavior) the stimuli that constitute the Muller-Lyer illusion we say "The one on the left is larger." but when we lay a ruler against the lines we say "They are both the same size!" Think about this for a while, Brent. Ten or twenty years should be sufficient. But I do admit that it (i.e. the Moon Illusion) is a bigger problem for behaviorism than representationalism because behaviorism is "hamstrung" by the pesky notion that explanations and theories should not consist of nonsense. I have already shown why "seeing a representation" (except in the literal sense of looking at a photograph etc.) is nonsense. The standard representationalist argument for illusions like the Moon illusion is that if we "see the Moon as large" it is because the representation (that we "really see") contains a large Moon. And why is it large? Why because the representation is an inference that the brain makes about "what is out there." More nonsense heaped on the top of nonsense. Brent writes: In other words, all representationalists that I know of consider such problems to completely obviously demonstrably falsify any such theories. Glen responds: You mean all representationalists whose initials are SL? But I suppose that others in that camp create as many straw men as those whose initials are SL. And that is because they are not interested in actually understanding the alternative view - you know, the view that is not riddled with nonsense? But I have been, I admit, up until now from your standpoint, cryptic. I have not really said how I explain the Moon Illusion. But you are not ready for that explanation.let's pick something easier. Say I present some shapes of different colors to subjects very briefly. One of the shapes is a "valentine." You know, "heart-shaped" in the card-playing sense. Say I present (remember briefly) this shape and it is literally non-reflective (black; so it would have to be presented on some background) . In any event, if I present the stimulus briefly enough, and ask the subjects what color it was, what do you think they will say? Chances are, or so Skinner claimed (but I think there was an actual experiment done that he was referring to, but I have been unable to track it down), that the subject will say that the stimulus was "red" (even though it was black) or, as Skinner claimed, sometimes "purple." Why might that be? If we "familiarized" a member of a "non-card-playing culture" (i.e., a "primitive" culture), with the apparatus, would such subjects proclaim the black heart to be red? No. Why? Why would they not? Here's the point: the representationalist would claim that the card-playing subjects' brains made an inference about the stimuli that the non-card-playing subjects did not. The card-playing subjects, then, saw a red representation (as evidenced by the fact that they said "red") , where the non-card-playing subjects "correctly" identified the stimulus as "black." Here's the point: the card -playing subjects are likely to identify the "heart" stimulus as "red," whereas it is clear that the average "bushman" will not. Bottom line: the card playing dude has a history where "valentine" shapes are paired with "red," and when a black heart is presented, the card player dude says "red." But other humans, without exposure to the same history, do not see the stimulus "as red." Perception is a function of history [Just like behavior!]. And it is a function of the same sorts of histories of which easily measured behavior is a function.

Glen, Ah, very good question. Is this question also as big a problem for behaviorists, as it is for other theories like all direct perception or naive realism theories? In other words, all representationalists that I know of consider such problems to completely obviously demonstrably falsify any such theories. Brent Allsop

Maurer, How does you theory explain illusions such as the moon illusion?

Brent, Glen, Having studied both your back and forth pro and con comments about behaviorism vs. representationalism (which incidentally, I essentially agree with)—I think you are both barking up trees and make little sense... Since all your arguments and counter arguments are specious and keep circling back on each other without any logical basis to qualify either position. So, here are the facts (not assumptions), as I understand them from both a scientific and practical engineering viewpoint: 1. The totality of every reflection of light from any objects or group of objects is a representation of the image of the entire scene whose individual point sourced rays, at different frequencies (representing subtly different colors, tints, tones, shades, etc., reflected from every point on the object of perception) converge, as a complete hologram of that scene, on every zero-point of 3-space between the observer/perceiver and the objects of perception. Vide; Bohm-Pribram's "holographic paradigm" demonstrations and proofs One of which can be demonstrated experimentally by simply looking at the sky, observing the Milky Way, and realizing that each ray of light from every star converges at every zero-point on the surface of your observing eye lens Just as the same scene projected on the dome of a planetarium, travels there on rays of light originating from a single point source. 2. The observer, therefore, can subjectively see (visually experience) that total frequency modulated reflected image (from any selected viewpoint in 3-space) as a reconstructed holograph or complete picture—at the zero-point located at the exact center of the brain's EM field (in the pineal area) directly behind the eyes and between the ears. [Incidentally, the perception of both vision and hearing must be at this stationary point—which besides allowing stereo binaural sound and binocular vision, also serves as a fixed reference to enable determination of the exact coordinate location of any point of visual or sound image origin, as well as also enabling coordination of those fields with the kinaesthetic body image field replicated in the brain as part of the kinaesthetic, neuromuscular, analog control system—guided by means of EM field harmonic resonances... This direct analog computational system (which cannot be accomplished by digital computers) is self evident—knowing that EM fields have no barriers anywhere within or surrounding the human body, and that all fields originating from any zero-point within the body, holonomically interpenetrate each other.] 3. The brain, then, can only function, simply, as the intermediate electrochemical transponder/transformer that assembles and converts the image pixels, received from each rod and cone on the retinas, to a wave interference patterned hologram in the brain-wave field—carried on its radiant surfaces similarly to the way audio-video images are temporarily stored and transmitted through radio wave fields, received at individual stationary antenna, detected point by point and transformed/transmitted to individual pixel points on a screen and to individual point source loudspeakers—whose radiant energy fields are representational replicas of the original fields reflected or projected from their initial objective sources. 4. As an obvious conclusion from the above facts, it is also self evident that the mind and the memory are electromagnetic fields, along with their resonant higher frequency-energy fractal harmonic fields that reach down to the Plank volume and its ZPE fields surrounding every zero point of consciousness. So, obviously, all theories that claim representationalism or behaviorism that assume consciousness (awareness-will, qualia, etc.) is an epiphenomena of the brain's neurology, a quantum effect, such as "wave collapse", an electrochemical process, or the behavioral nature of any material object or field—is entirely mistaken... This, apparently eliminates most, if not all the camps and sub camps in the consciousness-mind canonized topic that do not consider those subjective functions of observer/responder consciousness as fundamental aspects of the absolute singularity at the origin of total multidimensional spacetime reality, as well as each field and form within it... With such consciousness being passively latent in all inorganic matter, and phenomenally expressive in all organic sentient beings—at varying degrees depending on their neural complexity And, with such media mind-memory information being separate entities from the brain's physical structures and neural-electrochemistry—as independent mutually resonant (coenergetic) harmonics of the brain's inherent and neural-generated electromagnetic fields. I hope this short description of actual subjective and objective reality—which doesn't violate any of the fundamental laws of quantum, relativity, or superstring physics—clears the air, and can add some truth to all the arguments flying around here that seem to contradict each other at every turn None of which offers any logical or scientifically reasonable solution to the consciousness-mind problems. Leon Maurer http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/17 http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/4

Hi Glen, Thanks for creating the camp, and sorry I hadn't realized that was your camp. The "Mind is behavior" camp ( http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/42 ) parent is currently Approachable Via Science which places it in a competing sibling position with Meroe's Detection, Reaction, and Association camp. If there is anything in Meroe's (and now Grey's) camp that you disagree with, it is definitely correct not to support it, or to place your camp in a supporting position to it. If you support a camp, that implies that you agree with everything it says, and everything all parent camps say. The best thing to do in such cases is to, in the particular camp forum, point out the things you disagree with, and indicate your willingness to join and support the camp, if such is moved to a lower level camp where you will not have to support it. This is how the "Representational Qualia Camp" has formed. My current camp is the "Material Property Dualism" camp (http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/7 ) and most of the stuff in that camp, and the other camps between it and the Representational Qualia Camp were once all in the parent camp. We are always motivated to get as many people as possible in the higher level camps, so we moved much of the stuff others disagreed with down into ever lower and less important camps, so they could join without having to support something they disagreed with. We had to put quite a bit of collaborative effort to use neutral terminology that we could all agree with at those higher levels. I would think Meroe and Grey would be very open to any changes you might propose (including additions to the statement), since it would mean wining an obviously very motivated, intelligent and influential supporter to their camp. Once they moved the disagreeable stuff to a lower level camp, you could change your camp's parent to be the improved and more agreeable version as a supporting camp instead of the current competitor position. You questioned the purpose for voting. Does that mean you have no value for knowing if there is a 'scientific consensus' on various issues or not? Say even something important like global warming? So many people claim there is a scientific consensus amongst experts, yet there is lots of evidence that allows people to doubt such claims. If we had a rigorous, quantitative, and definitive proof of how much consensus there was, nobody could doubt such. I think knowing, definitively, who the experts are, and knowing quantitatively how much consensus there is amongst them is of critical importance to our ability to manage the ever more important moral and life threatening issues we face in the future as our power as humans continues to increase. I'm reading all that you are saying, but have troubles fully understanding why you think some of this is so problematic, and why you think some things are so important, that I fail to see much value in. We just obviously think of things very differently, and I think such diversity of thought is a very good thing - the more diversity the better. Brent Allsop

Brent writes: Hi Glen, Thanks for further explaining your views. You are correct in pointing out my error at just lumping you in with all radical behaviorists, Gibsonia's, (including 'new'), embodied cognition and so on. Since all these points of view are so foreign to my way of thinking, it's hard to tell you guys apart, let alone remember what it is you think is important. So I very much appreciate your help so I can better understand you. And THIS is the purpose of canonizer, not "argumentum ad populism". Glen responds: Hi Brent, You keep saying this, but then you seem to contradict it elsewhere. What is the purpose of the "survey" part of it? What difference does it make how many people adhere to a particular position? Don't get me wrong, I like the site because it may allow me to get into a good ol' fashioned intellectual donnybrook. But I think the survey portion is largely meaningless. I did, however, in honor of your endeavor, start a camp. I don't think it is in the right place in the hierarchy though. It should probably have been placed under "Consciousness from detection, reaction and association." I don't agree with much of what they say, but I do agree with some of it. Anywayguess how many people have signed on to my position? None, and around here that is all there is likely to be. Even if there were some adherents from the "embodied cognition" people, the fact that I call myself a radical behaviorist would keep them away, even if they basically agreed with everything I might say. The institutionalized misrepresentation, and de facto censorship, of radical behaviorism is enough to make people want to not be associated in any way with the philosophy. Further, the de facto censorship of behaviorism is so successful, that relatively few people have any understanding of radical behaviorism or behavior analysis. Brent writes: I desperately want to know, concisely and quantitatively, what everyone that holds a different point of view believes, in all their subtle differences, and so on. This is not possible for me to create a concise representation of what all you guys believe, so I'm pleading with everyone to help us, collaboratively, get a good concise and quantitative representation of what everyone currently believes. Most people tend to think their view is more in the minority than they think. Religions do this all the time. Thank you for pointing out that my 10 year old perceptions that representationalism was in the minority, was grossly in error. And I would also assert that your view that your beliefs are in the minority, might also be off, at least a bit. Again, that is another purpose of canonizer.com - to come up with rigorous measurements of such, so people can have a better irrefutable idea of reality. And even though the more popular camps obviously have more influence in the system, I am always arguing for, and supporting how important the minority camps are also. Again, we need to know all of them, concisely quantitatively and efficiently (i.e. not repetitively). Glen responds: I am quite sure that I have not underestimated the popularity of radical behaviorism. I am not quite sure about how popular "embodied cognition" is (and I have already argued that much in that position is similar to radical behaviorism), but I doubt it is too popular. I'm not sure I understand what you mean by: "Again, that is another purpose of canonizer.com - to come up with rigorous measurements of such, so people can have a better irrefutable idea of reality." if it is not a reference to some alleged relation between popularity and "truth." Brent writes: You mentioned that my "position doesn't predict anything" but I think differently. We are making not yet proven or testable theoretical predictions about what science is about to show us. And the definitive way we will know that such predictions turn out to be true, is when you and everyone else jumps from your soon to be falsified camps, making falsified predictions - to our camp. And of course the opposite could happen, we could turn out to be wrong, where science will force us to jump to your or some other better camp that was making better predictions all along. Glen responds: I'm not sure I understand what you are saying here, but I think you are making pretty standard claims about science and falsification etc. Much of what is said about how science works is nonsense, but even if the hypothetico-deductive model of science, as applied to behavioral issues, was not overly simplistic and overly optimistic, it still would not apply to representationism which is not an hypothesis; it is an assumption. Brent writes: You described a phototropic robot: Say you build a robot that shows a phototropic response. An array of directional photosensitive transducers drive the mechanism such that the wheels on the side opposite the light source turn more than those that are ipsilateral. When the stimulation is equal, the thing goes to the light source. Any alleged "representation" is utterly gratuitous. I think ALL this is representation, and not gratuitous at all. Glen responds: That's pretty much what I said (and it is a claim to which you did not respond as far as I can tell). For you, it appears, there is no causation that is not a kind of representation. I find that a very, very damaging aspect of your position. Brent writes: We start with the initial cause of the perception process, the surface of the strawberry reflecting 700nm light. The first causally downstream 'representation' in the seeing perception process is the reflected 700nm light. Glen responds: See? For you everything is representation. SoI ask again, is the motion of the distal end of a lever a representation of the motion of the proximal end? What ISN'T representation in your view? Brent writes: This light is a representation of the strawberry, thought it is not fundamentally, and surely not phenomenally, anything like the strawberry. In order to get a representation of the strawberry from the light, you must properly interpret the causal properties of the light. Glen responds: But, since everything for you is representation, "interpret[ing] the causal properties of light" must be more representation. Solight hits the retina. The receptors "fire." These cause other neurons to "fire." At some point, however, I'm guessing that you will claim that "interpretation" takes place. No? But this must have to do with nerves that are in some sense "afferent" with respect to the neural representation. There are "nerves that go to the representation." But if the nerves are affected in some systematic way by the representation aren't they simply MORE representation? What makes one set of firings that are systematically related to the thing seen a representation and some other set "interpretation"? After all, we have one seamless series of connections. The light (according to you) is a representation of the object - the light hits the retina and makes another representation and so on. But all there is all the way down is, so to speak, "nerves firing as a result of other nerves firing." That all sounds like more representation (by your usage) to me. Doesn't it to you? Brent writes: And every other causally downstream representation has the same ineffable problem - they must be properly interpreted to extract the meaning. Glen responds: OKbut of what does this interpretation consist? Does it involve any neurons that "receive information" from the brain area(s) currently composing the "representation" or, I guess, within which the representation is held? What makes these neural firings "interpretation" and not more "representation." I guess you might say that what makes these interpretation and not representation is that activity here causes behavior. Brent writes: This is also true for your phototropic robot. The transducers must be set up properly, so some causal properties somewhere in the light detection process, even if it is only the light itself, so that it steers the robot. Glen responds: You mangled this sentence a bit Brent (or so it seems to me), but I think that you are saying what I said above, and that the "evidence of interpretation" is the behavior of the robot. The behavior is not the "seeing," I'm sure you will argue, but it suggests that the representation has been "interpreted." No? But this does not answer my question. If all we have is receptors that "fire" in ways systematically related to the light reflected from the object, attached to nerves that "fire" in ways systematically related to the firing of the receptors, and so on, all there is is more copying. Right? Yet suddenly, this copying becomes "interpretation of the copy," in a totally unexplained way. Further, the position seems to imply that behavior is somehow systematically related to the neural activity that immediately preceded it, in a way similar to the way the reflected light is related to the object from which it was reflected, i.e., related in the way we mean when we say it is a "representation") . No? Its all just stuff that happens that is systematically related to the stuff that immediately follows and so on, at any step of which we can say of the systematicity that it is "representation." Isn't that what you meant when you said of the phototropic robot, "I think ALL this is representation, and not gratuitous at all"? And then you proceeded to talk about the causal chain leading from stimulus to response. But, as I said, the end of the chain, must somehow be related to the stimulus in the same way that any of the earlier representations were related to still earlier representations. So behavior is a "representation" of the stimulus? This seems to be nonsense. Plus, as I have been trying to point out, you want to say that it is ALL representation but, somehow, at some point, it is "interpretation." The position is reduced to gibberish by its own inconsistencies. Brent writes: All these causal representations, including the ones that must be interpreted appropriately as ones and zeros, can be considered as abstract knowledge. Their causal properties can be used to control yet other properties that cause yet more behavior. The big difference between this and conscious knowledge, is that our knowledge is represented with phenomenal properties of the 'gray matter' that can be unified together into our world of unified awareness. Things included in this unified working space include phenomenal representations of us - or our 'spirit', represented as 'looking' out of our knowledge of our eyes, at the strawberries - even though this unified phenomenal knowledge of our spirit looking at the strawberries, has no referent in reality. Glen responds: I'm sorry, but this sounds more and more like obfuscationism and gibberish. Sounds to me like you are saying that there is all this transfer of information from state to state (and that is ALL there is), each state having the relation to the previous state that could be described as "representation," all the way to behavior with respect to "what is seen," and some place magic happens. Brent writes: You say: "The "must be" implies some sort of logical machinery behind the declaration, but I see none." and you always only focus on the resulting behavior. And to me, this is evidence that you don't yet fully understand what we are saying. Glen responds: Then show precisely where I have demonstrated this misunderstanding. Seems to me that the "evidence" you have that I have misunderstood is that I am ridiculing the position. Brent writes: When we use a digital camera that has an array of pixels that can be one (for red) or zero (for green) we can take a picture of the strawberry patch. But these digital ones and zeros must be property interpreted as strawberry color and leaf color, before you can have enough knowledge to allow one to pick the strawberry. Glen responds: I understand what you are saying, and I always have. What I am pointing out is that it is internally-inconsistent and devoid of sense. Either "it" is all "representation," as you said earlier, or there is "representation" and "interpretation," as you say immediately above. Which is it? Brent writes: Also, instead of digital memory, you could have some phenomenal brain matter or a neural correlate that had a red quale to be used to represent the strawberry, and neural correlate that had a green phenomenal property to represent the leaves. You would still have to appropriately interpret the red, as the strawberry, and the green, as the leaves, in order to pick the strawberry. But the big difference is, these representations are phenomenally like something, and red and green are phenomenally very different from each other. And you don't have to have any behavior wired to this conscious knowledge for these phenomenal facts of the matter (there is much more to the representations than just causal properties) to be true. Glen responds: Again, this mostly sounds like gibberish to me, so I guess you could say that I don't understand your position. But I think it sounds like gibberish, not because it is profound and difficult, but because it is devoid of sense. And it is devoid of sense because it embraces the mereological fallacy (i.e., some brain part "interprets"), and it is simply internally inconsistent. Brent writes: Have I converted you to our camp yet? ;) If not, I hope you get a camp started so I have a good concise reference that will help me better know just what it is you believe, and so I can know just how many people agree with you or like thinking of things in this way. Brent Allsop Glen responds: As I said, I have already "set-up" a camp, but I expect no adherents. Most academicians are representationlists, as are most amateurs, because the camera metaphor is easily pushed. It is easy to forget that a photograph is a representation because it engenders some of the "effects" of the thing that it is a photograph of. But this sort of representation (the photo) requires eyes, a brain, and ultimately a body for it to be "interpreted." But once you put the copy inside the brain, the metaphorical nature becomes clear. With what eyes do we see this inner representation, and to what brain are these eyes connected? But that is where I began my criticism, so I must be done for now.

Hi Glen, Thanks for further explaining your views. You are correct in pointing out my error at just lumping you in with all radical behaviorists, Gibsonia's, (including 'new'), embodied cognition and so on. Since all these points of view are so foreign to my way of thinking, it's hard to tell you guys apart, let alone remember what it is you think is important. So I very much appreciate your help so I can better understand you. And THIS is the purpose of canonizer, not "argumentum ad populism". I desperately want to know, concisely and quantitatively, what everyone that holds a different point of view believes, in all their subtle differences, and so on. This is not possible for me to create a concise representation of what all you guys believe, so I'm pleading with everyone to help us, collaboratively, get a good concise and quantitative representation of what everyone currently believes. Most people tend to think their view is more in the minority than they think. Religions do this all the time. Thank you for pointing out that my 10 year old perceptions that representationalism was in the minority, was grossly in error. And I would also assert that your view that your beliefs are in the minority, might also be off, at least a bit. Again, that is another purpose of canonizer.com - to come up with rigorous measurements of such, so people can have a better irrefutable idea of reality. And even though the more popular camps obviously have more influence in the system, I am always arguing for, and supporting how important the minority camps are also. Again, we need to know all of them, concisely quantitatively and efficiently (i.e. not repetitively). You mentioned that my "position doesn't predict anything" but I think differently. We are making not yet proven or testable theoretical predictions about what science is about to show us. And the definitive way we will know that such predictions turn out to be true, is when you and everyone else jumps from your soon to be falsified camps, making falsified predictions - to our camp. And of course the opposite could happen, we could turn out to be wrong, where science will force us to jump to your or some other better camp that was making better predictions all along. You described a phototropic robot: Say you build a robot that shows a phototropic response. An array of directional photosensitive transducers drive the mechanism such that the wheels on the side opposite the light source turn more than those that are ipsilateral. When the stimulation is equal, the thing goes to the light source. Any alleged "representation" is utterly gratuitous. I think ALL this is representation, and not gratuitous at all. We start with the initial cause of the perception process, the surface of the strawberry reflecting 700nm light. The first causally downstream 'representation' in the seeing perception process is the reflected 700nm light. This light is a representation of the strawberry, thought it is not fundamentally, and surely not phenomenally, anything like the strawberry. In order to get a representation of the strawberry from the light, you must properly interpret the causal properties of the light. And every other causally downstream representation has the same ineffable problem - they must be properly interpreted to extract the meaning. This is also true for your phototropic robot. The transducers must be set up properly, so some causal properties somewhere in the light detection process, even if it is only the light itself, so that it steers the robot. All these causal representations, including the ones that must be interpreted appropriately as ones and zeros, can be considered as abstract knowledge. Their causal properties can be used to control yet other properties that cause yet more behavior. The big difference between this and conscious knowledge, is that our knowledge is represented with phenomenal properties of the 'gray matter' that can be unified together into our world of unified awareness. Things included in this unified working space include phenomenal representations of us - or our 'spirit', represented as 'looking' out of our knowledge of our eyes, at the strawberries - even though this unified phenomenal knowledge of our spirit looking at the strawberries, has no referent in reality. You say: "The "must be" implies some sort of logical machinery behind the declaration, but I see none." and you always only focus on the resulting behavior. And to me, this is evidence that you don't yet fully understand what we are saying. When we use a digital camera that has an array of pixels that can be one (for red) or zero (for green) we can take a picture of the strawberry patch. But these digital ones and zeros must be property interpreted as strawberry color and leaf color, before you can have enough knowledge to allow one to pick the strawberry. Also, instead of digital memory, you could have some phenomenal brain matter or a neural correlate that had a red quale to be used to represent the strawberry, and neural correlate that had a green phenomenal property to represent the leaves. You would still have to appropriately interpret the red, as the strawberry, and the green, as the leaves, in order to pick the strawberry. But the big difference is, these representations are phenomenally like something, and red and green are phenomenally very different from each other. And you don't have to have any behavior wired to this conscious knowledge for these phenomenal facts of the matter (there is much more to the representations than just causal properties) to be true. Have I converted you to our camp yet? ;) If not, I hope you get a camp started so I have a good concise reference that will help me better know just what it is you believe, and so I can know just how many people agree with you or like thinking of things in this way. Brent Allsop

Brent wrote: You mentioned the sites premise was based on "argumentum ad populum", but this is not it at all. It is more a survey and communication system (so it is much easier to simply say I'm in camp X, rather than spending days explaining to someone, just what it is you believe.) Today, if your theory is not accepted by the popular consensus of the people managing a or the journal, you get censored. Back in the 90s, It seemed like everyone was making this infinite regress argument to me, including journal publishers, and I thought the representational view was by far in the minority. At the time, I wanted to create this system, so even my minority view could be represented without getting censored. But, very surprising to me, this view is so far in the leading consensus. Till things become more comprehensive, it can still be argued that this is because of my bias. Glen responds: Hi Brent. Representationalism has never been a minority view. What "journal publishers" have made infinite regress arguments to you? Representationalism is all but ubiquitous with virtually the only dissenters being (1) radical behaviorists, (2) "Gibsonians," and (3) the new Gibsonians who dub their position "embodied cognition" (EC). No doubt radical behaviorists would be censored by many journals, but the EC people have hidden (most of the time even from themselves!) that their position is essentially behavioristic. Indeed, when O'Regan and Noe published their tome in BBS, several commentators denounced their position as "just behaviorism." Not much substantive comment was then necessary; to simply accuse someone of behaviorist leanings was deemed sufficient to refute their argument! Such is the case in mainstream psychology and the myriad of fields that it has corrupted. ButI have rambled some, and gotten ahead of myselfthe main point for now is that representational is now, and has always been, the dominant view of everything psychological. It starts with the seeing of representations and moves seamlessly to the storing and retrieving of representations. Similar to this is the notion that "knowledge" is stored in some sort of equivalent of propositions. Brent wrote: I'm in the camp that believes consciousness can be explained "in terms of physical properties of the brain, or described in scientific language..." and I believe Glen is making this infinite regress argument because Glen doesn't yet fully understand "Representational Qualia Theory" It simply predicts that 'seeing' has two critical parts. The initial cause of the perception process, and the final results, or knowledge that represents its referent. When a robot 'sees' the world, the final result of its perception systems, are a model, represented abstractly by ones and zeros, of what it 'sees'. Representational Qualia theory predicts the important difference between us, and such a robot, is that our representations are represented by phenomenal qualities of the matter in our brain (red vs green) instead of ones vs zeros. If you know something (whether you see it or not), there must be something that is that knowledge. This in no way implies that you need some infinite regress that has knowledge of that knowledge forever - for either the robot or us. Glen responds: First of all, Brent, your position doesn't "predict" anything - its adherents simply assume what they later argue is demonstrated. Second, I see nothing in what you said that "I didn't understand." Arguing that the robot's "model" is "represented abstractly by ones and zeros," is utterly beside the point. It is not the nature of the representation that is at issue. What is at issue is that any term you want to use to describe what is done with the alleged representation will be some other term that refers to the behavior of the whole organism. The charge of "infinite regress" is the same as the charge of "homunculism" which is the same as Bennett and Hacker's "mereological fallacy." Third, surely your "our representations are represented" is a misstatement? You must have meant "our representations of the world are" . No? In any event your claim that "representations are phenomenal" simply assumes what you claim to show. Say you build a robot that shows a phototropic response. An array of directional photosensitive transducers drive the mechanism such that the wheels on the side opposite the light source turn more than those that are ipsilateral. When the stimulation is equal, the thing goes to the light source. Any alleged "representation" is utterly gratuitous. Further down this thread, Lehar will claim that all robots that have some kind of video camera or other sensory device are an "existence proof" of the "principle" of representationalism. I say this is nonsense; to say that the phototropic robot I have described is somehow "using a representation" is to simply interpret all sensory phenomena - and ultimately all phenomena - in terms of the core assumption! If I turn on a flashlight is the resulting light a representation? What is it a representation of? The phototropic robot is simply a sort of complicated switching device. The wheels are driven by light, to say that it is really driven by a representation of the light invites the notion that all causation is really "representation," but perhaps that is what you wish to argue? And your "If you know something (whether you see it or not), there must be something that is that knowledge." pretty much illustrates what I have been saying. The "must be" implies some sort of logical machinery behind the declaration, but I see none. What I see is that you have simply assumed the same sort of principle that you claim to show. The motion of an old locomotive's wheels are not a representation of the coal in the burner. A fourth issue, and what underlies the whole conceptual morass that is mainstream-psychology-and-the-fields-it-has-corrupted, is its insensitivity to the normative use of language; i.e., that which dictates "sense" and "nonsense." How is the word "know" actually used? This may be contrasted with other things that are said about "knowledge being a thing," and other sorts of locutions that have an origin in arcane philosophies. The word "know" in ordinary usage is, at the heart of it, simply a reference to doing. A person that hits a baseball "knows how to hit a baseball." Similarly, a person that "knows Einstein published a paper in 1905" is a person that says "Einstein published". The word is also used in the context of statements logically-derived from locutions that stem from observations of behavior; a person that tries a door, finds it locked, and immediately lifts the mat and retrieves a key "must have known there is a key there." Finally, as to Brent's last paragraph, I reiterate that the whole idea underlying this forum is a logical fallacy, i.e., the argumentum ad populum. It simply does not matter (from the standpoint of generating science and cogent philosophies) how many people agree with me. And, as I have said, your assertion that representationalism is, or was, some sort of "downtrodden" upstart simply does not jibe with even a cursory examination of the history of philosophy and psychology. Lehar writes: The problem with the *infinite regress* argument is that if you refute it once, soundly, irrefutably, with extensive elaboration, the argument keeps coming back again and again as if it had never been refuted! There's an infinite regress for you! Glen responds: Lehar seems to conflate "refutation" with "cogent refutation." He has always simply assumed representationalism, and then proceeded to interpret any and all observations from within that framework. I remember - even without looking back at the links Lehar has provided - that Lehar once said something very close to "If we see a 3-d world, there MUST be a 3-d representation." This says it all, in my opinion. Representationalism is, and always has been, an assumption within which observations are interpreted. Lehar writes: For those on the sidelines, the oft-restated refutation of the infinite regress argument can be summarized succinctly thus: There is no need to have a second observer of the internal representation, the representation need only be available to other internal mechanisms and processes in the brain, not to a miniature copy of the whole brain. Glen responds: The "need" for a "second observer" is embedded in language use, and it is language that must "take a holiday" (c.f. Wittgenstein) in order that this be acceptable. Ultimately, representationalism holds that we do not see the world, we see a representation. Lehar wants to disguise this by avoiding the use of the term "see" a second time. Say he did not avoid this (as he did not in the "quote" that I remember - I do not know whether the quote appears in the links; I am purposely responding prior to looking there - also, I admit that what I have attributed to Lehar may not be a direct quote, but it is very, very close). Then what he is saying is that there are two kinds of seeing. Seeing the world requires a copy, but seeing the copy does not. But if there is a kind of seeing that does not require a copy, then why is this not the "kind of seeing" that characterizes the whole person (or nonhuman animal) when we say things like "John saw the ball coming at his head." But he does avoid the use of "see" a second time; instead he writes: "the representation need only be available to other internal mechanisms and processes in the brain, not to a miniature copy of the whole brain." But this is simply an ad hoc assertion whose sole purpose is to derail arguments concerning the implications of the other things he says. If seeing requires eyes and a brain (not to mention the whole muscular system that is involved in moving the eyes - a prerequisite for almost all vision), then seeing a copy must require internal eyes and a brain-within-the-brain. That is simply a logical conclusion. But Lehar will have none of that. He wants to have his cake and eat it too. The logical implications of representationalism are clear and they do not simply disappear because one says that they do. Big Brother said "war is peace" but that does not make it so. Lehar writes: The *principle* behind representationalism is demonstrated by every robot that responds to sensory input provided by a video camera or other sensory device, where the image is read and responded to by internal algorithmic mechanisms. Robots provide an *existence proof* of the feasibility of the *principle* of representationalism. Glen responds: I have already discussed this in my reply to Brent, but it is worth repeating: if the phototropic robot that I describe can be said to have a "representation," then ALL causation can be framed in this way. What is gained? It is the light that controls the behavior of the robot I described, not a representation of the light. Lehar writes: If you disconnect the video cable between the camera and the computer, the computer no longer has access to the internal representation of external reality, and the robot becomes blind. The same happens to a human if you sever the optic nerve. The internal representation of external reality *is* required for humans and robots to see. The blind robot is a demonstration of the *infeasibility* of vision without representations. Try as you might, the computer can't see the world without it, and neither can we. The principle of direct perception has *never* been demonstrated in *any* artificial or robotic mechanism, because it is impossible in *principle*. Glen responds: I'm sorry, but this is nonsense; it is simply another example of implying that ALL causation is "representation." If you sever the connection between the photocells and the motor in the robot I described it is blind. Similarly, if you sever any of the three neurons that are involved in the postural reflexes that are evidenced by the "knee jerk," the lower leg is "blind" to the hammer's fall. But do you really want to say that the fall of the little rubber hammer is "represented" by the neural activity? And if so, then the light that comes out of my flashlight is a representation of the chemicals in the battery, or some such rot. And why stop there? Is the movement of the distal end of a stick that is functioning as a lever a representation of the motion applied by the person pushing on the proximate end? Try as you might, the distal end of the lever cannot cause a stone to move if you cut the stick in half. Q.E.D. representationalism? The principle of direct perception is demonstrated by the robot I described - unless, of course, ALL causation is "representation." If that is adhered to then, indeed, it is IMPOSSIBLE to demonstrate "direct perception" because it has been defined out of existence! Representationalism is, and always has been, an assumption, and it is the scourge of mainstream psychology and the fields it has corrupted. Representationalism is not "wrong" it is devoid of sense.

Brent, Glen, Steve, I have a firm belief in a representational view of consciousness—since I know that whatever we see of an object is an internal image reproduction of the information carried by the light reflected from it... And, I certainly can't imagine how an infinite regress has anything to do with our experiencing of such an image. Even though that experience seems to be located at a single point of view in the center of our head behind the eyes and between the ears, or at the exact focal point in the center of the brain wave EM field recorded by an EEG. So, unless such images are carried as modulated wave interference patterns on that field and transmitted resonantly down to that singular stationary POV by simple harmonic resonance -- I am still waiting for someone in the representational camp to tell me how the brain distinguishes between almost infinitely different colors, tints, tones and shades, how such qualities of light are separated and perceived by the brain's neural structures as if they all were at a single point of observation, and how the brain becomes conscious (aware) of the differences, or uniquely experiences their particular qualia at that point? IOW, what is the physical nature of the brain's chemistry or its structure that enables it to experience a particular color, tint, tone or shade at any point in the total visual image as being a different qualia than any other point within the total holographic image perceived. And, specifically, what is the physical nature of the representation in the brain that replicates any specific quality of the light image reflected from the object of perception? e.g.; What is the difference between the green color replica in brain, and the red color replica, and how do we perceive their different qualia? Seems to me that, so far, without answers to those questions all such claims That consciousness can be explained "in terms of physical properties of the brain, or described in scientific language..." are simply guesses that have no basis in either logical explanation or evidential facts. In fact, since I believe (having logically proved and demonstrated by mind and other experiments) that all visual information of consciousness, before and after electrochemical processing by the brain's neurology, is carried as holographic wave interference patterns (holograms) on radiant electromagnetic fields (and their resonant harmonics)—and that awareness-will, as pure subjectivity, are fundamental qualities of primal, pre-cosmic or absolute space—which is ubiquitously located at every ZPE source of every radiant field throughout total spacetime... Therefore, It's perfectly obvious to me that all theories claiming that consciousness is an epiphenomena of the brain's neurology or its processes, or that consciousness can be explained "in terms of physical properties of the brain (including some which claim that colors are a property of the brain) or described in scientific language..." are entirely mistaken guesses... As is naive realism, or any idea that claims subjective consciousness (awareness, will, qualia, etc.) may be behavioral processes in themselves, or the results of them. So, what good is a canonizer that only rates and gives credence to what we believe in, rather than what we can rationally explain or prove? As far as I can see, the numbers giving the representational camp the lead over all other theories of consciousness and mind are meaningless. So, even though my ABC theory of cosmogenesis, consciousness and mind is representational, in that the perceived images of consciousness are brain processed representations of the objects of perception (as information carried by electromagnetic fields)—they are not material aspects or products of the brain, its neurology or chemistry, nor can they create or experience consciousness (awareness, will, qualia, etc.)... Therefore, I cannot include its camp as a subcamp of the representational camp or any subcamp in it. Leon Maurer