Brent_Allsop replied 15 years ago (Apr 25th 2009, 10:25:07 pm)
It is great to have John Smythies now supporting the Consciousness is Representational and Real camp. And to have a camp representing his Smythies-Carr Hypothosis as a supporting sub camp.
John has specifically declared that he does not support a Mind Brain Identity theory. Yet several people have communicated to me that an important part of what they believe about the mind is its identity with the brain. And they have also indicated this isn't adequately represented in the current camp survey structure. I happen to currently be in this camp and would like to see these ideas much more explicitly represented in a camp that we all support.
So, towards this end, I propose a competing sibling camp to John Smythies Smythies-Car Hypothosis camp as defined below.
I propose that the following 3 sub camps be moved into a supporting sub camp position of this new camp:
* Consciousness Arises from Any Equivalent Functional Organization
* Nature Has Ineffable Phenomenal Properties
* Self-centered virtual reality
As always, if anyone has any ways of improving this, or if they would object to any of these changes when proposed, please help us work out some better way to do things for which you would not object.
* Name: Mind-Brain Identity
* Title: Mind-Brain Identity Theory
We believe that the mind or consciousness is identical with brain states.
As it states at [http://www.philosophyofmind.info/mindbrainidentity.html philosophyofmind.info]: "for every mental state there is a brain-state with which it is identical."
The main support for mind-brain identity theory is the phenomenon of localization. We believe mental events are associated with specific parts of the brain. Mental activity is localized in identifiable areas of the brain. This is shown by the fact that inhibiting brain activity inhibits mental activity. Those who suffer localized brain damage also such localized damage to the mind.
Many Mind-Brain Identity supporters, may or may not be representationalists, and may or may not believe in the importance of qualia or phenomenal properties. As should be obvious by the supporting parent camps to this camp, we believe consciousness is representational and that phenomenal properties, or qualia, are a critical and fundamental part of consciousness. The various diverse theories of what and how qualia are held by members of this camp are contained in supporting sub camps.