The problem that I have with all of these discussions is that the begin from flawed assumptions, so that however rationally they proceed from there, it ultimately leads back, in a circular fashion, to the original bad assumptions.
The first is that, as Mark Waser writes in his article:
"1. There really is an external reality composed of physical objects (and their movements extending to the extent of complete processes like orbiting a star, etc.)."
There is no support for this from a completely objective point of view. While we can judge that there certainly seems to be a universe which goes on without us being present, there is no reason why we should jump to the conclusion that there is a such a universe which is independent of all beings - of all perception and experience.
It should be a clue that when we imagine the universe without perception, we cannot help but imagine a universe exactly as it is from our experience. Atoms are very small, a thousand years is very long, stars are bright, rocks on planets are heavy, etc. Of course, this is complete nonsense. Without a human sized, lifetime scaled phenomenon to serve as the orienting frame of reference, there is no qualitative presentation which can have precedence over any other. Past, future, fast, slow, enormous, tiny, etc... all meaningless. There is no here or there, no way to recognize any distribution of particles as a pattern or any pattern of energy as a particle. Indeed, a universe without an observer is indiscernible from nothing at all. It could only be silent, invisible, intangible. In short, there can be no "external reality".
The second great mistaken assumption about the Hard Problem is that qualia has something to do with representation. It does not. Qualia is presentation. It is the source of all presence. Representation does not need qualia at all. As we have seen, any kind of quality which can be detected by an instrument can be digitized into a generic representation. Qualia would not only be superfluous and unexplainable, it would be an impediment to the transfer of information.
The third false assumption in the Hard Problem discussion is derived from the second - after jumping to the conclusion of qualia as representation, the next premature jump extends the metaphor to conscious experience as a model or simulation. If qualia were a representation, an encoded symbol, then it would make sense indeed that a network of symbols (a model) is a good way of describing our experience.
"Per Hofstadater , Damasio , and others Llinas , consciousness/self is simply a process running on a physical ("strange") loop/feedback network created per Richard Dawkins'  speculation that "perhaps consciousness arises when the brain's simulation of the world becomes so complete that it must include a model of itself"."
A natural speculation if you are approaching consciousness from the outside, where it has no qualia or presence and can only be inferred by smuggling in our own knowledge of our own consciousness. Consciousness does rely heavily on feedback loops, but feedback of what? Loopness? There's no physics there, no participation or presence.
In reality, what is being looped can only be something which is already sensory or proto-sensory for it to conceivably scale up to the full blown human interiority which we experience. A model need not have any more or an experienced presence than a symbol does. It is simply processed from one encoded form to another and never is there any decoding into a significant experience. Inputs are compared with logical expectations, outputs are produced. I doesn't matter whether those outputs are hunting a wild boar or incrementing a memory register. There is no way to assign any visceral realism or qualia to differentiate the two, and of course, none are needed. Critical processes need only be assigned higher priority, not some kind of fireworks display of flavors and colors.
As far as the 'is my red your green?' conversation goes, the confusion is because visual qualia is unusual in that it is presented as the most object-like feeling that we can experience. Red is still a feeling, but it is a visual feeling, which seems to be scoped or tuned toward experiences which convey the third person perspective - detached, fully available to examination as a knowable shape/design/color. It is a feeling which in the most public facing way.
What this means is that visual qualia is actually a second order qualia, the first being the feelings that we have *about* the color, or through the color. It is very confusing indeed if we don't realize this and conflate both qualia as a single one. From optical experiments we have seen that our visual sense is highly resilient to experimental manipulation, and will quickly route around tricks, such as flipping the image upside down or pushing the chroma median away from true yellow. We get used to it and our visual presentation returns to its inertial norm despite having altered optics.
Combine these two and we can understand that it is a two way street, with our first order feelings driving the perceptual inertia from the inside out and the second order visual feelings being partially driven by optics. I don't know if we all have the same green and red, but if I had to guess, I would say that we have first order feeling qualia which are both more human-universal and personal-idiosyncratic, and second order visual qualia which is more local-physiological-cultural.