Brent, I've made the change suggested, I think. One of the things that confused me is that the camp name is not the same as the name identifying the camp that appears in the tree view. Stathis.

Stathis, Yes, you just got the parent and the child mixed up and moved the parent under the child instead of the other way around. richwil could have always objected to the change you made preventing it from going live, since it was his camp you changed, but I just easily removed the record containing this change so it is now back the way it was before the change. If you could go back and do the same "Manage/Edit This Camp" action on your camp page here: [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/12 http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/12] Then change the parent camp to: "Functional Equivalence" Since this is your camp, and you are the only member, the change should go live instantly. I would do the change for you, but if I did it, it would take one week before it went live to be sure you didn't object. Thanks for your willingness to persist till things are right. Brent

Brent writes: "So, stathis, could you temporarily remove your support from the 'arises from anything' camp, and then change the parent to your 'computational functionalism' camp to this arises from anything camp? (don't use the 'Remove Your Support' button, as it is temporarily not working - instead, use the 'Modify Support for This Camp' link and then select the delete check box for this particular camp before you commit.)" I have attempted to do that, but I may have mucked it up.

richwil writes: "Absolutely not: functionalism does not equate to computational functionalism! Computational functionalism is wrong because it either denies (phenomenal) consciousness or allows a thermostat or a Chinese room to be conscious. The claim that a computer program could implement the self-model is wrong in the same way as claiming that an operating system is aware because it has a monitoring module/subroutine." The point of Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" paper is that if a system can reproduce the external behaviour of the brain, then by a process of deduction it must also reproduce the phenomenal consciousness of the brain. It may be that a digital computer *can't* give rise to brainlike behaviour, for example because to do so would require non-computable physics; but if it can, then it will *necessarily* also give rise to consciousness. Read the paper carefully and then point out where you think Chalmers has erred in his reasoning.

Ah, this is a classic super camp with 2 supporting sub camps situation. Both richwil and stathis agree with Chalmers' camp. But they have two competing beliefs about what it means. Is it equivalent to "Computational functionalism" or not? So the best way to represent this would be to instead of having the "Computational functionalism" camp as a competitor to the arises form anything camp - move it into a supporting sub camp position to it. Then if stathis is only in this camp, he will get a full vote for it, and a full vote for the parent camp (instead of fractional credit for the misleading competing way it is now represented.) So, stathis, could you temporarily remove your support from the 'arises from anything' camp, and then change the parent to your 'computational functionalism' camp to this arises from anything camp? (don't use the 'Remove Your Support' button, as it is temporarily not working - instead, use the 'Modify Support for This Camp' link and then select the delete check box for this particular camp before you commit.) If richwil wanted to, he could add a response in his competing camp arguing why he thinks they are not equivalent. Oh, and just an FYI note to xodorap. In case you didn't know, you posted your 'Computational functionalism & Equivalent Functional' post to the entire topic forum, not just to this camp forum. So, it doesn't appear in this camp forum (it appears in the topic forum) and it was sent out to all 17 members of the topic, instead of just to the 5 members of this camp. Everyone else probability didn't know what we were talking about unless they are following this camp's forum. Also, rather than starting a new thread, you can continue posting to any existing thread. Thanks everyone, it is fun to see things progress! This is now the most supported topic at canonizer. Brent Allsop

Brent I do not see that "arises from anything" is the same as "functionally equivalent". The point is that there needs to be an organised something which gives rise to consciousness: it doesn't just arise from bathwater, and the organisation has to be of a certain order/kind: there's no ghost in your TV set. The meaning of "equivalent" is the important differentiator for my camp. I have tried to explain by noting that IMO Chalmers' examples cannot give rise to consciousness however they are arranged. I'm not quite sure where to draw the line (if i did then i'd understand consciousness :) though we can agree that swapping neurons makes no difference to consciousness and disagree over whether a computer program will do. IMO, the latter will produce a zombie. My support for the self-model camp is because IMO this is essential to consciousness. I don't see that nature has phenomenal properties except in the sense that we are natural and we have phenomenal properties. The redness is in the brain and not the strawberry. Stathis Absolutely not: functionalism does not equate to computational functionalism! Computational functionalism is wrong because it either denies (phenomenal) consciousness or allows a thermostat or a Chinese room to be conscious. The claim that a computer program could implement the self-model is wrong in the same way as claiming that an operating system is aware because it has a monitoring module/subroutine. Quite what is necessary about the functional organisation of neurons that gives us consciousness is of course the hard problem :) cheers Richard

I feel that the parallel camps "consciousness arises from any equivalent functional organization" and "computational functionalism" are more or less equivalent and could be combined. -Stathis Papaioannou

Richwil, at the moment, you are the only one listed in Chalmers' [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/9 Consciousness arises from any equivalent functional organization] camp. Also, I just noticed that you recently started supporting xodorap's [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/21 Updating Model of Self in the world] camp. (Congratulations, xodorap for having a second person in your camp, the most well supported camp at this level.) Chalmers' 'arises from anything' camp is a definite competitor to my [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23/2 Nature has Phenomenal Properties] camp. I very much disagree with Chalmers on this issue. Also, I know that Stathis also agrees with this 'arises from anything' camp, or at least at one time he did. So, my question is, of the other 2 people in this camp, Steve and Xodorap, which side of this issue are you on? Do you agree with Chalmers' 'it arises from anything' idea, or do you fall more on the Nature has phenomenal properties camp? Or perhaps you have some completely different idea. I'm just wondering and thinking we could get what we all believe on this issue more accurately represented in fewer camps. I think it would be better if we could unify some of the camps at this level. If you are the only one in a camp, it might be better to unify that camp with another camp, rather than splitting your vote across two competing camps (resulting in less than one total vote when you are split.) Also, Richwill and Xodorap, we don't have camps for you in the [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/81 Mind Experts] camp. I sure would like to get camps started for each of you so I can rank you above all the other people that have crazy ideas about consciousness. Would you be willing to create camps for yourselves and add some personal bio info? Or could you send me a bit so I can create a camp for each of you? Or I may just create a camp just indicating what I know about each of you, so I can rank you as I believe you deserve to be considered 'Experts' above many others. Thanks, Brent Allsop